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ABSTRACT 
In Norway, there has been an absence of discussion concerning the 
distribution of responsibilities and relations between the policy makers and their 
intelligence supporters. The public and political focus has been primarily on the 
intelligence community’s execution of their missions and on ensuring that there is 
an established legal authority with political oversight and control. 
This thesis discusses Norway’s foreign and security policies and their 
relation to the Norwegian political system. It also considers how the national 
policy makers could better utilize the more than one billion NKR spent yearly on 
the intelligence services. 
The thesis concludes that there is adequate political control over the two 
main intelligence services, the Norwegian Intelligence Service and the 
Norwegian Police Security Service. However, the thesis recommends changes 
that would improve the intelligence supporters’ ability to serve their principals, the 
political decision makers in the government, more effectively. The thesis argues 
for the establishment of a joint intelligence support element at the Office of the 
Prime Minister and the production of a Joint Requirement and Priority Document 
that would cover the nation’s overall intelligence needs and priorities. If 
established, the Document should be issued in both a classified and an 
unclassified version, to achieve broader political and public support. Finally, the 
thesis examines the overall structure of the intelligence services and 
recommends that the Intelligence Service be directly subordinated to the Minister 
of Defense, not the Chief of Defense, as it is today. This change would increase 
the Intelligence Service’s closeness to and support of the executive power and 
raise it to the same governmental level as the Norwegian Police and Security 
Service. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This thesis will analyze the relationship between Norway’s government 
decision-makers and the intelligence community and identify shortfalls. The 
thesis will suggest ways to improve and enhance the effectiveness of the overall 
structure of the intelligence services to better meet the requirements of 
government officials in the future.   
During the past twenty years, debates about the Norwegian Intelligence 
Community (NIC) and its reorganization focused on establishing a more 
controllable and politically acceptable legal authority. The established distribution 
of responsibility was left almost untouched and only a limited amount of literature 
is available for academic study. 
The Sårbarhetsutvalget commission report to the Storting, Report #9 for 
2002–2003,1 envisions “a safe and secure society that would prevent threats and 
defeat crises.”2 It discusses the nation’s overall preparedness and organization in 
this regard and recommends changes in a variety of areas, including Norway’s 
readiness structure. Although the intelligence community is described, the report 
pays little attention to its overall structure and distribution of responsibility. Nor 
does it discuss either the relationship between the Norwegian Intelligence 
Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or how the Norwegian Police Security 
Service contributes to the nation’s national security policy. The report does state  
 
                                                 
1 The Storting Standing Committee of Defense and Standing Committee of Justice, Report 
#9 (2002–2003), The Road to a Less Vulnerable Society (Instilling fra forsvarskomiteen og 
justiskomiteen – veien til et mindre sårbart samfunn); available from 
http://www.stortinget.no/inns/2002/200203-009-004.htm (accessed May 10, 2007). 
2 Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU) 2000:24, A Vulnerable Society: Challenges for 
Norwegian Security and Preparedness (Et sårbart samfunnn, Utfordringer for sikkerhets-og 
beredskapsarbeidet i samfunnet), July 4, 2000, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/NOU/20002000/024/PDFA/NOU200020000024000DDDPDFA.pdf  
(accessed May 10, 2007). 
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that it is not a given that the Norwegian Armed Forces should have a national 
intelligence responsibility, even though the Forces’ need for appropriate 
intelligence support is highlighted.3 
The thesis will argue that the Sårbarhetsutvalget and other commissions 
view the intelligence community too single-dimensionally and will show that 
support of Norway’s government decision makers is an important responsibility 
that should also be an aspect of focus. As Report #9, A Vulnerable Society: 
Challenges for Norwegian Security and Preparedness, points out, “In Norway, 
there is little tradition for the utilization of intelligence by the government 
administration.”4 No head of any ministry has total responsibility for the national 
intelligence services. Historically, that responsibility has been divided between 
the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Justice and Police. As the Report 
concludes, “The fragmentation of responsibility can hinder essential information 
from reaching the proper political level, because the different data are not related 
to one another.”5 
In Norway, there has been little debate about how to use the intelligence 
community in support of the national foreign policy except in protecting Norway 
against threats from nations and nonstate actors. No conceptual approach in 
regard to the use of intelligence in forming and implementing Norway’s foreign 
and security policies has been observed. 
This thesis will show the current flaws in the overall structure linking 
Norway’s government establishment and its intelligence support systems. In the 
Conclusion, the thesis will suggest ways that the intelligence agencies could be 
integrated more closely into the decision-making process so as to give the 
policymakers more comprehensive support and a more comprehensive 
foundation for their decisions.  
                                                 
3 Norges offentlige utredninger (NOU) 2000, 258. 
4 Ibid., 254. 
5 Ibid., 257. 
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B. BACKGROUND  
Intelligence serves and is subservient to policy and . . . it works 
best – analytically and operationally – when tied to clearly 
understood policy goals.6 
This quote, from Mark M. Lowenthal‘s Intelligence: From Secret to Policy 
(2006), describes well the relations between policy-making and intelligence. The 
main reason nations generally have a strategic intelligence service is to support 
by informing their national political goals. Beneficial strategic intelligence, as 
defined in U.S. Presidential Executive Order 12333 (2004) is: “Timely and 
accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans and intentions of 
foreign powers, organizations and persons and their agents.7 A short introduction 
of strategic intelligence is described in Chapter V. 
Norway’s current government Security Policy Summary describes the 
anticipated future requirements of the intelligence communities and shows clearly 
that the focus of the Security Policy changed after the disintegration of the Iron 
Curtain in 1989.   
Today’s security challenges are less linked to traditional military 
threats due to the increased possibility of terrorist attacks and 
large-scale environmental and natural disasters. The expanded 
security concept and an integrated approach have been assigned 
increasing importance following the Cold War. Political, economic, 
security, and military means are knit closely together within the 
framework of an overarching strategy designed to prevent and 
handle crises and to offer lasting and stable solutions to conflicts.8 
                                                 
6 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intellignece From Secret to Policy, 3d editon (Washington, D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2006), xi. Lowenthal is an experienced government service officer, including years in the 
legislative branch, the executive branch, and the CIA. 
7 Presidential Executive Order 12333: United States Intelligence Activities, available from 
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-
order/12333.html?template=print#1.1 (accessed February 19, 2007). 
8 Norwegian Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Security Policy,  available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/Sikkerhetspolitikk/Sikkerhetspolitikk.html?id=86753. 
(accessed February 18, 2007). 
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Norway’s current government’s policies are described in the Soria Moria 
Declaration, 2005–2009.9 Although those policies differ slightly from one political 
party or group to another, the overall direction is the same. The government’s 
main goals, in addition to protecting Norway’s mainland and its economic 
interests in the nearby seas, include playing an increasing role in international 
politics, reducing terror-related activity, and helping create a more peaceful world 
society.  In addition, the thesis considers possible domestic threats within 
Norway itself. 
During the 1980s and ’90s, there were numerous accusations of the 
Norwegian intelligence community, claiming it had carried out illegal surveillance 
on and registration of Norwegian citizens and organizations. Sections of the 
military intelligence service also were accused of not being under acceptable 
national control. Subsequently, public pressure led to a number of investigations 
and reorganization, however minor. Pressure from the media, society, and 
politicians resulted in the formation of an investigative parliamentary committee, 
the Lund Commission.10 Because the commission had real access to all the 
intelligence services’ archives, both the commission and its conclusions were 
well accepted and respected by all the political parties and stakeholders involved. 
The commission took two years to conclude its investigation. Only minor 
illegalities were identified and no one was charged. Nonetheless, the process led 
to several reorganizations and the enactment of new laws for regulating the 
various services and defining and clarifying their objectives.   
The laws and reports passed by the Storting concerning the intelligence 
community focus mainly on the two national intelligence services’ dual 
responsibilities: the Norwegian Intelligence Service’s (NIS) responsibility for 
protecting the country against external threats and the Norwegian Police Security 
                                                 
9 The Norwegian Government, Policy Document for 2005–2009, October 13, 2005. Available from  
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/smk/rap/2005/0001/ddd/pdfv/260512-regjeringsplatform.pdf  
(accessed February 18, 2007). 
10 Document #15 to the Storting, March 28, 1996. The commission was headed by  Counsel Ketil 
Lund. Initially, the report was classified SECRET (NOFORN); declassified March 8, 1996, by the Storting.  
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Service’s (NPSS) responsibility to protect the country against internal threats. 
Some challenges inherent in this division of responsibility are evident in the 
October 2006 Royal Instructions, “Regulations Concerning Cooperation between 
the Norwegian Intelligence Service and the Norwegian Police Security 
Service.”11 Historically, however, the legislative branch has paid little attention to 
the role of the strategic intelligence services in informing and supporting the 
national decision-making process. 
In a speech on November 2006, the director of the Intelligence Service, 
Major General Hagen Torgeir, highlighted the challenges faced by the 
intelligence community. His remarks were especially significant because it was 
the first time in forty-four years that an intelligence director had given a public 
address. The topic was the Role of the Norwegian Intelligence Services in 
Today’s Changing World. 
The clear and distinct dividing line between purely domestic and 
foreign affairs has become blurred. . . . This change has led to an 
increased number of clients and boosted expectations in regard to 
the products we [the NIS] can deliver. . . . Intelligence is being more 
and more accepted as a natural part of the decision-making 
process.12 
Following the speech, in an article in Norway’s leading newspaper, 
Aftenposten, in December 2006, Olav Riste, a former professor at the Norwegian 
Institute for Defense Studies, now retired, raised a number of critical questions 
concerning three crucial areas: the intelligence community’s overall organization 
and structure, the military intelligence service’s role in the national security-policy 
                                                 
11 Royal Instructions: Regulations concerning cooperation between NIS and NPPS for 2006,10-13 nr 
1151 (Instruks om samarbeidet mellom Etterretningstjenesten og Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste), available 
from: http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/ldles?doc=/sf/sf/sf-20061013-1151.html (accessed May 30, 2007). 
12 Torgeir Hagen, November 20, 2006, The Norwegian Intelligence Service in a Changing World 
(Etjenesten i en omskiftelig verden),  a speech given to the Oslo Military Community. Torgeir Hagen is the 
Director of the Norwegian Intelligence Service and a Major General.. Received via e-mail form NIS, 
February 2007. 
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and threat-warning process, and the overarching issue of quality control.13 Riste 
is a well-known author and expert on the Norwegian Intelligence Service14 and 
his article triggered a public debate in Norway’s major newspapers.  
C. LIMITATIONS 
The extent of this thesis is limited due to its reliance on unclassified 
sources. This is a weakness because much pertinent and important information 
is classified and thus inaccessible. Nonetheless, as an unclassified study it has 
strength in that it is freely accessibility by the general public, who can then 
debate its content and general implications. All the thesis descriptions and 
references are traceable through open sources. 
The thesis addresses only issues that are at the national strategic level, 
and does not discuss the question of a possible merger of the Norwegian 
Intelligence Service and the Norwegian Police Security Service. Given that 
Norway is a small country and that an examination of such a merger might be of 
some interest, this research shows that such a merger is not a workable option 
for two major reasons. The two services’ focus areas and missions are too 
different, and a merger would create huge legislative and oversight challenges. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS:  
This thesis addresses three main questions and a number of sub- 
questions.   
Question 1. How should Norway’s strategic intelligence community be 
structured to assure that it plays a fully effective role in the government’s policy 
decision-making process concerning, in particular, 
                                                 
13 Olay Riste, Intelligence in a New Time (Etterretning i en ny tid), Aftenposten, December 18, 2007. 
Aftenposten is the leading Norwegian newspaper (conservative), available from 
http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/article1573485.ece (accessed January 24, 2007). 
14 Riste also wrote The Norwegian Intelligence Service 1945-1970 (London, Portland, OR: FranK 
Cass, 1999), an unclassified history of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS). 
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• Support of national policies pertaining to foreign affairs, security, and 
defense  
• Protecting the nation and maintaining the security of both the populace 
and the national infrastructure  
Question 2.  How should Norway’s future intelligence services be 
structured so as to ensure: 
• A short and clear chain of command 
• Provision of relevant, timely, and reliable information 
• Legislative, executive, and public support 
• Unity of effort 
Question 3. If a change of structure is deemed necessary for the best 
political support, what are the estimated consequences for: 
• command-and-control relationships  
• the Norwegian Armed Forces 
The five remaining chapters of the thesis are designed to answer these key 
questions.  
As grounds for comparison with the Norwegian system, Chapter II will 
describe the U.S. intelligence community, its relationship to the legislative and 
executive branches, and the way it supports the goals presented in the U.S. 
National Security Act. However different Norway and the United States are in the 
size and execution of their intelligence ambitions, this thesis chose the U.S. 
intelligence community for comparison because there is better access to 
unclassified and reliable information concerning it than for other more 
comparable nations. 
Chapter III will describe Norway’s political system, its governmental 
decision-making process, and the relationship between its executive and 
legislative branches. The chapter will also describe the main actors in the 
  8
Norwegian strategic intelligence community and their regulations and objectives. 
Comparisons to the United States will be included when appropriate and 
applicable. 
Within that context, Chapter IV will describe the political goals of the 
Norwegian government currently in power, as presented in its charter and other 
official documents. The national security environment and future threats will also 
be discussed. 
Chapter V will discuss criteria for the role of the intelligence services in 
effectively and relevantly supporting the decision-making process, as well as 
ways that that supportive role might be further enhanced and improved.   
Chapter VI will summarize the preceding analyses and discussions and 
will argue for improvements in the decision-making structure.  
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II. THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY:  
ITS ROLE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
This chapter will discuss the U.S. intelligence community, its relation to the 
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, and its support of the 
goals outlined in both the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and 
Presidential Executive Order 12333, 1981 and 2004.  
 
 
Figure 1.   An overview of the stakeholders in the U.S. intelligence community 
 
The United States is the world’s sole superpower and will no doubt 
continue in that role for the foreseeable future. At present, the United States 
executes an expansive foreign policy that has some degree of impact on most of 
the countries around the globe. Thus, any reorganization of its intelligence 
services is of great interest. Recently, U.S. intelligence agencies have 
experienced their toughest public scrutiny from the media and Congress since 
the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. For researchers, one of the most 
beneficial results has been the new availability of in-depth, reliable information.  
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In the U.S. media and within the government in general, we find an array 
of definitions of “intelligence” that vary considerably. Nonetheless, the definitions 
of “national intelligence” in the 1947 National Security Act, as amended October 
13, 2004,15 and in Executive Order 12333, updated August 27, 2004, essentially 
agree.16 They both focus on the intelligence services’ obligation to support the 
President and the National Security Council. 
Goals. The United States intelligence effort shall provide the 
President and the National Security Council with the necessary 
information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and 
development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the 
protection of United States national interests from foreign security 
threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill 
this goal.17          
A. THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A BRIEF HISTORY  
The United States has used “spies” to do intelligence gathering since at 
least as early as early as the War of Independence (1775–83) under the first U.S. 
President, George Washington (1789–97). But the first intelligence service, the 
Office of Naval Intelligence in the Department of the Navy, was not formally 
established until 1882, and the second, the Military Intelligence Division in the 
Department of War, two years later. 
At that time, they were established more in support of the warfighter than 
in support of the government’s national strategic decision making. During the 
First World War and until 1927, the Department of State provided intelligence 
support for the policy makers. An office known as the Black Chamber (1918–29), 
sponsored by the Departments of State and War, the first national effort for 
cryptological analysis, was the forerunner of the National Security Agency. Its 
                                                 
15 The National Security Act of 1947, as Amended Oct. 13, 2004. Available from 
http://www.intelligence.gov/0-natsecact_1947.shtml. Accessed March 11, 2007.. The Act was further 
updated by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, Dec. 17, 2004. 
16 Presidential Executive Order 12333: (still valid after update of Aug. 27, 2004) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/print/20040827-6.html.Accessed May 7, 2007 
17 Ibid; see also Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secret to Policy, 2. 
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activity ended when the State Department withdrew its support, with a now-
famous quote from then Secretary of State Henry Stimson, "Gentlemen do not 
read each other’s mail." Stimson would go on to be appointed Secretary of War 
during World War II.  
The origin of today’s intelligence apparatus was the Office of the 
Coordinator of Information established in the summer of 1941. The OCI was later 
reorganized and renamed the Office of Strategic Service. Although President 
Roosevelt was a strong supporter of the Strategic Service under Director Bill 
Donovan, President Truman, his successor, did not favor involvement with a 
secret intelligence organization and on September 20, 1945, it was disbanded. 
However, developments between U.S. allies after World War II forced Truman to 
reconsider the need for a national strategic intelligence agency. For a brief time, 
the Central Intelligence Group served that purpose until, in 1947, the National 
Security Act established the Central Intelligence Agency with a brief thirty-line 
text presentation.18  
All three involved departments – State, Navy, and War – opposed the 
CIA’s formation, as did the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). At the time, 
both the President and the Congress were focused on merging the Navy and 
War Departments into a consolidated Department of Defense, forming a 
permanent Joint Chiefs of Staff, and creating the National Security Council 
(NSC). Thus, initially, the CIA was intended only to “correlate,” “evaluate,” and 
“disseminate” intelligence from other services.19 The further development of the 
CIA was shaped primarily by the President and his executive branch, and without 
serious interest from the legislative branch, as described by Zegart.20 The CIA  
 
                                                 
18 R. George and R. Kline, eds., Intelligence and the National Security Strategist, (Roman 
and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2006);  Amy Zegart, “Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency,” 
37.  
19 Amy Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999), 163. 
20 Ibid, 221 
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and its Directorate of Operations developed into an agency involved in great 
number of clandestine operations around the world, more or less in support of 
the Presidents policy. 
 On March 2, 1995, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision 
Directive 35, defining his intelligence requirements.21 The Directive emphasized 
that the highest priority of the intelligence services is the support of military 
operations. Directive 35’s focus on the warfighter was contrasted to and 
overruled by the now updated NSA and Executive Order 12333 in 2004. 
With the enactment of the National Security Act, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, in addition to being the director of the CIA, became responsible for 
coordinating the collection and analysis of intelligence throughout the entire 
intelligence community. However, it gave him no budgetary or command 
functions, nor any authority to forge interagency collaboration.22 As Amy Zegart’s 
Flawed by Design shows, this reconfiguration of responsibilities only hampers the 
work of the U.S. intelligence services. Zegart points out that, with such a lack of 
authority over departmental agencies, the DCI “could only hope to provide the 
President with high-quality, coherent intelligence.”23 The 9/11 Commission 
addressed these same problems, as did the National Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004. The subsequent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence was an 
attempt to compensate for some of the problems. 
Nonetheless, as L.K. Johnson explains, some of the challenges are rooted 
in the U.S. Constitution: “The executive branch of Government in the U.S. is 
required to share its powers with the legislative and judicial branches. While this 
can lead to frustrations and inefficiencies, its virtue lies in the accountability that 
sharing provides.”24 
                                                 
21 Presidential Decision Directive 35: Intelligence Requirements, March 2, 1995, available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd35.htm (accessed May 12, 2007. 
22 Zegart, 188. 
23 Zegart, 190, emphasis added. 
24 R. George and R. Kline, eds., Loch K. Johnson, “Balancing Liberty and Security,” 65. 
Johnson is a former staff member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 
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B. LEGISLATIVE POWER: THE U.S. CONGRESS 
The U.S. Congress is a bicameral institution consisting of a Senate and 
House of Representatives. “Since the end of World War II, Congress has passed 
only two major pieces of intelligence legislation: the National Security Act of 1947 
and the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.”25 Prior to 1974, the 
Senate and the House exercised little will or interest in executing oversight over 
the intelligence services. From his study of the findings of the Church Committee 
in 1974, Zegart concludes, “It is clear that the Congress did not carry out 
effective oversight.”26 As he notes, the representatives’ lack of interest was also 
a result of the issue’s complexity, its time-consuming execution, and the special 
security arrangements required. Furthermore, intelligence matters rarely have an 
impact in a representative’s home district. It is also significant that the intelligence 
services are part of and work for the executive branch.27 Therefore, the 
development of the CIA and other agencies was for a long time left almost 
entirely to the purview of the President and his cabinet. This lack of legislative 
interest changed, however, during the seventies. In 1974, after the Church 
Committee report,28 restrictions were placed on the President concerning covert 
actions.29 In 1976, a Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established 
and, in 1977, a House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was also 
established. Both were to execute political oversight over the intelligence 
services. 
There are a number of areas in which the House and Senate can exercise 
their jurisdiction over intelligence programs: budgets, staff, hearings, and 
                                                 
25 Lowenthal, Intelligence.  
26 U.S. Senate Church Committee Report, 1976,11; cited in Zegart, 194. 
27 Lowenthal, 215. 
28 The Church Committee, or the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with 
Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, 94th Congress, was the first thorough 
examination of the U.S. intelligence community. 
29 A covert action is an activity, or activities, by the U.S. government intended to influence 
political, economic, or military conditions abroad, but in which it is intended that the government’s 
role will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. 
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investigations. During the late ’70s, ’80s, and ’90s, several investigative 
commissions were established with varying results and effectiveness. The most 
important recent committee was the Joint 9/11 Commission, which resulted in the 
National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.  
Concerning intelligence agency budgets, the Senate Intelligence 
Committee has oversight jurisdiction only over the National Foreign Intelligence 
Programs. The House Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction over those and 
over the Joint Military Intelligence Programs.30 This problematic situation has 
been addressed a number of times, but so far no changes in the oversight have 
been implemented. 
C. EXECUTIVE POWER: THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
In the United States, the responsibility for national security belongs to the 
executive branch and was rarely seriously challenged by the Congress before 
the 9/11 Commission report. Figure 2 gives an overview of the intelligence 
structure the President has at his disposal in developing and supporting his 
policies.  
                                                 
30 Richard A. Best Jr.,“Intelligence Issue for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, RL33539, 
updated October 4, 2007; received via e-mail from NPS Library, October 16, 2007. 
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Figure 2.   Overview of the intelligence assets attached to the U.S. President  
 
For the President and his foreign policy, the most important advisory body 
is the National Security Council, which was a creation of the National Security 
Act of 1947. According to Michael Donley’s May 2007 paper, “Rethinking the 
Interagency Systems,” the Security Council’s main responsibilities are:  
• to understand the circumstances, intelligence, and other information 
pertaining to a given issue;  
• to precisely define U.S. interests and select the desired goals and 
outcomes; and  
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• to evaluate and select, from among alternative means and risks, the 
most effective path to achieve the desired outcome, that is, a strategy.31  
 
In the years since 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence’s lack of 
authority to enforce the coordination and unity of intelligence efforts was 
addressed numerous times. Most recently, it was highlighted in the 9/11 
Commission Report.32 Subsequently, the Commission’s recommendation for 
better coordination and management throughout the intelligence community was 
included in the 2004 National Intelligence Reform Act. The Act formally 
established the office of the Director of National Intelligence, with the intention of 
making the DNI an independent cabinet-level position.33 According to the Act, his 
principal responsibilities are: 
• serve as head of the intelligence community; 
• act as the principal adviser to the President, to the National 
Security Council, and to the Homeland Security Council for 
intelligence matters related to national security; and 
• consistent with section 1018 of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, oversee and direct the 
implementation of the National Intelligence Program.34   
As compared to the Director of National Intelligence’s predecessor, the 
Director of Central Intelligence, in the Reform Act both the DNI’s authority and his 
responsibility are expanded. The DNI is assigned a staff of about 1,500 officers 
and a budget to execute given tasks. However, the Secretary of Defense 
                                                 
31 Michael Donley, “Rethinking the Interagency Systems,” Occasional Paper  #05-01, Hicks 
and Associated, Inc., available from http://www.hicksandassociates.com/reports/HAI-occasional-
paper.pdf (accessed May 20, 2007), used at NPS as part of class SO 3202. Donley has served 
for years in the government, including as a staff member of the NSC. 
32 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, September 20, 2004, 
411, available from http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch13.pdf . Accessed May 
11, 2007. 
33 Best, CRS 9.  
34 National Intelligence Reform Act (NIRA), 118, STAT. 3645, available from 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c108:4:./temp/~c108uJng9i (accessed April 15, 2007). 
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continues to exercise control of some 80 percent35 of the intelligence budget, an 
estimated $40 billion.36 The intent in creating the office of the DNI was to 
establish closer relations within the entire intelligence community, including 
involvement of the DNI in the budgetary and tasking processes and access to 
intelligence and other tasks described in Section 102A of the Act. To achieve 
increased cross-service cooperation and speed, specialized intelligence centers 
were established within the DNI office. 
The office of the DNI has the responsibility to develop a National Foreign 
Intelligence Program, while the Joint Military Intelligence Program is the 
responsibility of the Secretary of Defense, coordinated with the DNI. Many 
experts in the field believe that such a division of responsibility will continue to 
create unnecessary challenges for the DNI. 
In 2004, in the aftermath of the 9/11 Commission, a Joint Intelligence 
Community Council was established.37 The Council is headed by the DNI and 
consists of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, the Treasury, the 
Homeland Security Department, and the attorney general. The Joint Intelligence 
Community Council’s official functions are to “assist the DNI in developing and 
implementing a joint, unified national intelligence effort to protect national 
security.”38 As Lowenthal explains, the JICC is an executive oversight element of 
the President that serves as an advisory group for the DNI concerning 
requirements, budgets, performance, and evaluation.39 
The DNI and the National Security Council are closely connected to the 
President and are supposed to execute an overarching coordination of priorities 
and analyses across the fifteen different intelligence agencies and services. 
While the CIA is the only intelligence agency that the President can influence 
                                                 
35 Lowenthal, 46. 
36 Best, CRS 7. 
37 NIRA ,118; STAT. 3677, Sec. 1031. 
38 NIRA, 118; STAT. 3678. 
39 Lowenthal, 192. 
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directly, the Director of National Intelligence has now replaced the CIA director’s 
direct access to the President. After its establishment in 1947, the CIA quickly 
adopted some of the numerous tasks formerly performed by the OSS and 
became the president’s most important tool for influencing policy around the 
world. The 1961 CIA Directorate of Operation’s involvement in the Bay of Pigs is 
probably the most infamous attempt by a President to execute a major covert 
action. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important roles of the CIA, the 
DCI, and the Director of National Intelligence are to support the government and 
political decision-makers with timely and reliable intelligence. These routine 
intelligence productions, as outlined by Mark Lowenthal in his 2006 book, 
Intelligence: From Secret to Policy, are as follows.40   
• On a daily basis, the President Daily Brief is produced by the DNI and 
delivered to the President and his senior advisers every morning.   
• The Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB), previously known as 
the National Intelligence Daily, has a wider distribution, including the 
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence. The SEIB is an early-morning 
“newspaper” prepared by the CIA in coordination with the other 
intelligence producers. 
• The National Intelligence Estimate, signed by the DNI, is a series of 
long-term products of various subjects of high national interest and is 
the considered opinion of the entire intelligence community in support 
of the President and the National Security Council and their policy-
making.   
Although the different Secretaries have their own intelligence assets to 
maintain their short-term intelligence needs, the National Intelligence Council is 
                                                 
40 Lowenthal, 62–63.   
  19
the ”center for midterm and long-term strategic thinking.” The NIC is the key 
bridge within and between the intelligence community and the policymakers. The 
council is supported by senior analysts from across the community and is, in 
addition to the National Intelligence Estimates, producing a broad number of 
other joint analyses for use by the President and senior policy makers in his 
administration. Furthermore, the NIC is supposed to produce key intelligence 
priorities and collection and analyze guidance across the whole intelligence 
community.41 
D. EXECUTING DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES 
Subsequent sections will describe the other intelligence organizations and 
their tasks following the enactment of the National Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004. Numerous books and articles have been written about these departments 
and agencies. The 2007 Congressional Research Service Report to Congress 
gives an authoritative, concise, and clear summary of their tasks, and is partially 
cited in the following descriptions of the different agencies. The purpose here 
does not include an examination of the evolution of the different agencies. 
Intelligence collection is generally separated into three major categories, 
or “INTs”: Human Intelligence, or HUMINT; Signal Intelligence, or SIGINT; and 
Imagery Intelligence, or IMINT. Human Intelligence is the collection of information 
by and from human beings. Signals Intelligence is the interception of signals in 
the air, or by other means – voice, data, or other electronic signals, encrypted or 
not – between two or more emitters. Imagery Intelligence is imagery taken from 
above the Earth of selected targets. This imagery is collected in essentially three 
ways: by satellites, manned aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. An overview 
of the entire U.S. intelligence community is shown in Figure 3. The CIA is 
included in Figure 2. 
                                                 
41 Office of DNI, The National Intelligence Council: Their Mission, available from 
http://www.odni.gov/aboutODNI/organization/NIC.htm  (accessed October 22, 2007). See also 
National Security Act, Sec 101.  
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Figure 3.   U.S. Intelligence Agencies:  An Overview 
 
1. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
The CIA remains the key actor in the U.S. intelligence community. It has 
all-source analytical capabilities that cover the whole world outside U.S. borders 
and produces a range of studies that cover virtually all topics of interest to 
national-security policymakers.42  
Through the Directorate of Operations successor, the National 
Clandestine Service, the CIA is the U.S. agency responsible for human 
intelligence collection. It is also the agency that when needed is tasked to carry 
out covert operations in support of the President’s political goals. The 9/11 
Commission recommended that the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command 
                                                 
42 CRS, 3.  
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(SOCOM) take over responsibility from the CIA for the paramilitary operations. 
Either the CIA or the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not support this change. 
2. Department of Defense 
Although the 2004 National Intelligence Reform Act provides the Director 
of National Intelligence with extensive budgetary and management authorities 
over all the intelligence agencies, these authorities do not “threaten” the 
Secretary of Defense’s control of either the military intelligence agencies or the 
Joint Military Intelligence Program. The arrangement creates not only a need for 
close cooperation, but also an opportunity for disagreements and thus has the 
potential for greatly complicating the overall intelligence effort. 
a. The National Security Agency (NSA) 
The National Security Agency is responsible for national signals 
intelligence collection and evaluation and, since the Reform Act of 2004, the NSA 
has increased its domestic tasks. The secrecy surrounding the NSA has always 
been high. Indeed, so little has been known about it that it has been dubbed the 
“No Such Agency.” But a recent book, George and Kline’s Intelligence and the 
National Security Strategist (2006), gives a comprehensive assessment of this 
most secretive agency. After the end of the Cold War, the agency faced huge 
challenges, having recently gone through a little-known reorganization to 
increase the efficiency of this, the largest U.S. intelligence agency. 
b. The National Reconnaissance Office  
The National Reconnaissance Office is responsible for developing 
and operating reconnaissance satellites for the Department of Defense.43 
 
 
                                                 
43 CRS, 3. 
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c. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency  
The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency prepares the 
geospatial data, ranging from maps and charts to sophisticated computerized 
databases, necessary for advanced targeting.44  
d. The Defense Intelligence Agency  
As described on its official website, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency is designed to “provide timely, objective, and cogent military intelligence 
to war-fighters, defense planners, and defense and national security 
policymakers.”45 The agency is also responsible for the defense department’s 
attachés.  
e. Service-oriented Intelligence Organizations: U.S. Army, 
Navy, Air Force, and Marines 
The intelligence organizations of the four military services 
concentrate largely on concerns related to their specific missions. Their analytical 
products, along with those of the DIA, supplement the work of CIA analysts and 
provide greater depth on key technical issues.46   
3. The Department of State  
The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research is one of 
the smaller components of the U.S. intelligence community, but it is widely 
recognized for the high quality of its analysis. The Bureau is strictly an analytical 
agency and the diplomatic reporting from embassies, though highly useful to 
intelligence analysts, is not considered an intelligence function, nor is it budgeted 
as one.47 
                                                 
44 CRS, 3. 
45 Defense Intelligence Agency Mission Statement, available from 
http://www.dia.mil/thisisdia/mission.htm (accessed May 30, 2007). 
46 CRS, 3. 
47 Ibid. 
  23
4. The Department of Justice: The FBI  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation was founded as a law enforcement 
agency in 1908, but was also assumed responsibility for Intelligence gathering in 
Latin America in 1939.48, The FBI’s ambitions in the foreign intelligence area, 
was a part of their resistance against the formation  of the CIA. However, when 
these responsibilities were handled by the CIA, the FBI focused on its law 
enforcement, and counterintelligence role.  The FBI has been, and is, a major 
contributor the U.S. national counterintelligence and counter terror efforts and the 
national security. 
Thus, FBI has been forced to undergo a major shift in mentality to be able 
to use the information it gathers in counterterrorism and counterintelligence 
activities, not only for prosecution. Since September 2001, the intelligence aspect 
of the FBI’s mission has grown enormously in importance. It has been 
reorganized in an attempt to ensure that the intelligence functions are not 
subordinated to traditional law enforcement efforts. Most important, the Bureau’s 
law enforcement information must now be forwarded to other intelligence 
agencies for use in all-source products.49 
5. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  
The Department of Homeland Security is responsible for fusing law 
enforcement and intelligence information related to terrorist threats to the 
homeland. The Office of Information Analysis in the DHS participates in 
interagency counterterrorism efforts and along with the FBI focuses on ensuring 
that state and local law enforcement officials receive information on terrorist 
threats from the national-level intelligence agencies. The Coast Guard, now part 
of DHS, deals with information relating to maritime security and homeland 
defense.50  
                                                 




6. The Department of Energy  
The Department of Energy analyzes foreign nuclear-weapons programs, 
nuclear non-proliferation, and energy-security issues.51 
7. The Department of the Treasury  
The Department of the Treasury has a robust counterintelligence 
responsibility. It collects and processes information that may affect U.S. fiscal 
and monetary policies. It also covers the terrorist financing issue and is able to 
interrupt money-laundering activities that support terrorism.52  
E. SUMMARY 
The U.S. intelligence community is complex and comprehensive and in 
recent years has developed a tighter and closer relationship with the executive 
and legislative branches.  
The size and comprehensive nature of the U.S. intelligence community 
insures multiple interfaces with various policymakers within the U.S. government, 
and with the Congress. This in turn maximizes the availability support for 
decision-makers, and creates clear conduits for further intelligence collection and 
analyses. Because the U.S. intelligence community is closely tied to the larger 
national government at many points, it provides a useful comparison of Norway’s 
intelligence structure and its relationship to the nation’s governmental 
apparatuses.   
 




III: NORWAY: KEY ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES IN THE 
GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
This chapter will describe the roles of the various agencies, particularly the 
intelligence services, that contribute to the Norwegian government’s strategic 
decision-making process, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   Key actors in the decision-making process 
 
A. THE NORWEGIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM  
The Norwegian Constitution of 181453 divides Norway’s governing powers 
into three independent branches: 
• The Legislative Power: The Storting (§49)54  
• The Executive Power: The King and his Government (§3)55  
• The Judicial Power: The Courts of Law.  
                                                 
53 The Norwegian Constitution (May 17, 1814, updated March 30, 2007). Available from  
http://www.lovdata.no/cgiwift/wiftldles?doc=/usr/www/lovdata/all/nl-18140517-
000.html&emne=grunnlov*&& (accessed July 19, 2007). 
54 Though many nations call their legislative assembly a Parliament, the Norwegian 
legislative assembly is the Storting and is referred to by that name throughout the thesis.  
55 Officially, in Norway, the term ”Government,” though derived from English, refers only to 
the Prime Minster and his cabinet. 
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While the Judicial Power is not defined as specifically as the Legislative 
and the Executive Powers, its independence, as intended by the founding fathers 
has never been disputed.56 This power will not be discussed further in the thesis, 
because the Judical Power itself outside the focus of this thesis. 
As described in the widely accepted constitutional textbook, 
Statsforfatningen i Norge (The Norwegian Constitution),57  by Johs Andenaes 
and Arne Fliflet, the division of the three Powers is not absolute.  
The King has an interest in the Legislative authority and the 
Storting in the civil service. However, in executing the express 
authority the two powers have, they act independent of one 
another.58 
In the 1800s and early the 1900s, during Norway’s union with Sweden, relations 
between the Storting and the King’s Government were strained and troublesome, 
but for a long time now, the two branches have had a decent and constructive 
relationship.  
B. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER:  THE STORTING 
1. Introduction 
Norway has had a parliamentary political system, as is now common in 
Europe, since 1884. To maintain that system and to govern the country, the 
Government needs the support of the Storting; it cannot govern against the will of 
the Storting majority. In America, the founding fathers chose a different 
democratic solution: the people elect the President who then appoints the 
members of the cabinet. If the Norwegian Government loses the general support 
of the majority in the Storting, it must resign. Since Norway’s Independence in 
1905, this has occurred only twice. In 1928 and 1963, the Government had to 
                                                 
56 Johs Andenes and Arne Fliflet, Statsforfatningen i Norge (The Norwegian Constitution), 
10th ed. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2006), 206. The authors are the most respected authorities in 
Constitutional matters in Norway and Norden. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid, 72. 
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resign because of general mistrust from the Storting. In other resignations, the 
most common reasons were problematic elections and a change of the party 
constellation (13 times) and the Government’s request for the Storting’s support 
in a special case, which was denied (11 times).59  
As of 2007, the Norwegian Storting consists of 169 representatives from 
eight different parties. Since 1960, no party has been in the majority in the 
Storting. Most of the Governments have been minority Governments dependent 
on the cooperation of the different parties on a case-to-case basis. The 
Norwegian Government of 2007 is supported by a majority coalition in the 
Storting: the Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet) with 61 members; the Socialist Left 
Party (Sosialistisk venstreparti) with 15 members; and the Centre Party 
(Senterpartiet) with 11 members. 
2. The Storting  
According to the official Stortinget: Rules of Procedure, the Storting is 
divided into thirteen Standing Committees,60 which prepare all important matters 
before they are presented to the Storting. In composing these committees, every 
effort is made to ensure proportional representation from among the different 
political parties. Each committee’s work is related to a ministry with the same or a 
similar name. For the purposes of this thesis, the most important committees are, 
in alphabetic order: 
• The Standing Committee on Defense, or Forsvarskomiteen 
• The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, or  Utenrikskomiteen 
• The Standing Committee on Justice, or Justiskomiteen  
• The Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee, or Den utvidete utenriks-
og forsvarskomnite  
                                                 
59 Stortinget.no, The Norwegian Parliamentary History, available from 
http://www.stortinget.no/om_stortinget/forfatningen/parlamentarismen.html (accessed January 29, 
2007). 
60 Stortinget.no., The Norwegian Storting, Rules of Procedure, available from 
http://www.stortinget.no/english/rules_of_procedure.pdf (accessed July 17, 2007). 
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In Norway, there is no direct relation between the intelligence services and 
the Storting. According to the Secretary of the Defense Committee, there is no 
need for a Standing Committee for Intelligence.61 The Minister of Defense briefs 
the chairman and deputy of the Standing Committee on Defense yearly on topics 
related to the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS). The Defense Committee can 
also forward written questions concerning the Intelligence Service to the Minister 
of Defense, who then will respond. Further, the Defense Committee visits an NIS 
location yearly and can require further visits if necessary. The Secretary has 
highlighted the excellent working relationship between the Government and the 
Standing Committee on Defense and their ability to access intelligence reports 
when needed.62  
An Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee consists of the Standing 
Committees on Defense and Foreign Affairs, the President of the Storting, and 
the chairmen of the parties if they not already members.63 In 2005, the 
composition of the Enlarged Committee was changed to include the whole 
Standing Committee of Defense, instead of just the leader. Although this change 
reinforced the close relationship between foreign affairs and defense politicians, 
it also reduced the possibility for politicians from other committees to take part. 
The total number of committee members remained the same. The Enlarged 
Foreign Affairs Committee is a consultation organ between the Storting and the 
Government. On average, it has one meeting a month, but can meet more often 
if necessary. In terms of the Government’s foreign policy, the Enlarged 
Committee is the single most important committee because it concerns their 
ability to form and execute national foreign policy and security policy. As Anders 
Sjaastad, the former Minister of Defense and Representative to the Storting, 
points out, the Storting sees its role in the nation’s foreign policy not as one that 
                                                 
61 Interview with the Secretary to the Defense Committee, Bjarne Syrdal, September 4, 2007. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Stortinget.no., Norwegian Parliamentary History, available from 
http://www.stortinget.no/om_stortinget/forfatningen/parlamentarismen.html (accessed January 29, 
2007).  
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opposes the Government, but as one that supports a united national base-line.64 
In the Enlarged Committee, the focus is on the larger issues, not the headlines in 
the daily news.  
To most Norwegian politicians, maintaining national unity in Norway’s 
foreign and security policies is extremely important, although the nation’s 
relations with the European Union are and always have been an exemption. To 
achieve such a joint foreign policy, the so-called “national will” continues to 
create close connections between the political parties in the Storting and the 
Government. In this regard, the importance of the Enlarged Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the ability of the Government to discuss foreign policy matters 
with the Storting cannot be overestimated. All their meetings are classified 
SECRET, even the minutes, which are normally not available until a year later.65 
Recently, however, the necessity for such secrecy in the Enlarged Committee 
has been challenged, especially in regard to Norway’s current participation in the 
global war on terror and the use of Norwegian Special Operation Forces, 
because internal in the Government it is a dispute concerning such forces, by the 
socialists are looked upon as to aggressive. However, the Norwegian SOF 
contribution is well supported by majority of the Storting. 
Sjaastad has also addressed the post–9/11 challenges involved in 
separating Norwegian foreign policy from its security policy.66 For example, the 
Committee of Defense handles troop contributions to NATO and the UN, and the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs handles both the security policy and foreign policy. 
Another challenge is the development of international terrorism, because of the 
close connections between the Justice and Defense Committees.  
                                                 
64 Birgitte Fonn, Ivar  Neuman, and Ole Sending, eds., Norwegian Foreign Policy 
Experience: Actors and Processes (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Praksis-Aktører og prosesser), (Oslo: 
J.W. Cappelens forlag, 2006); C. Anders, “Sjaastad” (The Storting as a Foreign Policy Actor). 
65 Norwegian Parliamentary History.  
66 Fonn, 27. 
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Norway’s increased participation in international politics and trade has led 
to a reduction in the separation between foreign affairs and other matters.  
However united the Government and the Storting are in regard to the foreign and 
security policies, the Storting can also require a minister or other government 
official to attend hearings. The use of the hearing instrument has increased in 
recent years, especially in specific cases when the Storting wants an in-depth 
explanation. 
Although the Government has considerable authority, the Constitution 
grants the control of major decisions to the Storting. As described in § 26, the 
Government has the authority to go to war, but the Storting must validate any 
major treaty that will become national law.67  
On February 3, 1995, the Storting established its own permanent 
oversight committee, the EOS Committee, which has overarching legislative 
control of Norway’s three security services: the Norwegian Intelligence Service 
(NIS), the Norwegian Police Security Service (NPSS), and the Norwegian 
National Security Authority (NSA).68 The committee’s main purpose is not to 
instruct the services in their activities; it is one of oversight, to see that the 
activities of the three services are executed in keeping with applicable legislation. 
Because it reports to the Storting, the members of the EOS Committee cannot be 
members of the Storting at the same time.  
C. THE EXECUTIVE POWER: THE GOVERNMENT 
As stated in Norway’s Constitution, “The Executive Power is the King.”69 
According to § 12, the King selects Government Advisers. Today, this 
Government consists of a Prime Minister and seventeen ministries. As described 
in Andenaes and Fliflet’s text, the Government, on behalf of the King, is 
                                                 
67 Norwegian Constitution.  
68 EOS Committee, Tasks and Mission, available from http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-
wift/ldles?doc=/all/nl-19950203-007.html&1 (accessed August 4, 2007). 
69 Norwegian Constitution.  
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responsible for the central government administration. The head of the Ministry 
and his or her political and administrative staff in the subordinate departments, 
directorates, agencies, and institutions handle matters that do not have the 
importance necessary to be handled by the Council of the State.70   
According to Norwegian constitutional customs, a minister heads all 
governmental elements. As part of the “checks and balances” between the 
Executive Power and the Legislative Power, the Storting then holds each minister 
responsible for the activity within his or her area of responsibility. Thus, the 
Minister of Defense answers to the Storting for activity carried out by the 
Intelligence Service; the Minister of Justice and Police is responsible for all 
matters related to the activity of the Police Security Service, and so on.  
The Government holds two types of formal meetings: the Prime Minister 
hosts a Government Conference two times a week; and the Council of the State 
meets every Friday at the King’s castle. All cases are prepared and presented by 
a minister. In the Council, each of the ministers has one vote; the Prime Minister 
alone cannot decide the outcome. His responsibility is limited to the actions of the 
Government, not to actions performed by individual ministers. If a mistake occurs 
within one of the ministries, the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole 
are not held responsible. As a result, mistrust of any part of the administration by 
the Storting is aimed at the single minister in charge of that area. And, if a 
majority in the Storting vote to confirm the mistrust, the minister must resign. 
This constitutional custom gives the Prime Minister the luxury of 
“deniability,” since he has no knowledge of any issue unless either the concerned 
minister has forwarded it or his office has requested it. In this way, the Prime 
Minister is insulated from the direct consequences of any action taken by the 
Executive Power.  
In Norway, no one minister has responsibility for the national intelligence 
contribution.  This responsibility is split between the Minister of Defense and the 
                                                 
70 Andenes, 276. 
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Minister of Justice and Police. In comparison, in the United States responsibility 
for the intelligence community’s contribution to the national decision-makers is 
supposed to be in the office of the Director of National Intelligence.  
1. The Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) 
The Office of the Prime Minister is the central office of the Council 
of State and the Government. It is charged with preparing, carrying 
out, and following up the meetings of the Council of State with the 
King.71 
The quotation is from the Prime Minister’s official Web page and the Office 
of the Prime Minister’s tasks. The Office of the Prime Minister was originally an 
even smaller office than it is now, but its function has changed rapidly in recent 
years in keeping with the increase in Norway’s focus on foreign policy.72 Today, 
the Office consists of eight state secretaries, a political staff, and an 
administrative staff. Altogether, it consists of sixty-five civil servants, mostly 
drivers for the ministers and other administrative support staff. The Department 
for Domestic Affairs and the Department of International Affairs have only five 
members each. The overall structure is shown in Figure 5. In comparison, the UK 
cabinet office has fifteen hundred employees, including its own Intelligence 
Assessment Department headed by a permanent secretary.73 
 
                                                 
71 Government.no, The Office of the Prime Minister, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/The-Office-of-the-Prime-Minister.html?id=880 (accessed 
July 27, 2007). 
72 Fonn, ed., Norwegian Foreign Policy: Actors and Processes; Morten Udgaard; “The Office 
of the Prime Minister.” Morten Udgaard was the State Seretary at the OPM, 1984-86, with a Ph.D. 
from London School of Economics in international relations in 1971. He is recognized as a well-
respected journalist and editor of foreign relations in Aftenposten, a key conservative newspaper 
in Norway. 
73 UK Cabinet Office (of the PMIN), The Annual Report, available from 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/ann
ualreport/2007/intro.pdf (accessed Oct 24, 2007). 
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Figure 5.   The Office of the Prime Minister74 
 
While many of the ministries have interests involving national foreign 
policy, the two most concerned are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the 
Ministry of Defense (MoD). The main function of the Department of International 
Affairs is more to coordinate the ministries’ efforts than to be a “political 
dynamo.”75 Although coordination with the national foreign policy has increased 
in recent years, some lack of integration between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defense is still evident.  
In this regard, the author would like to draw attention to the experience of 
the United Kingdom in the Iraqi war. There, “the foreign policy decisions were 
increasingly taken at the Prime Minister’s Office at 10 Downing Street, not in the 
Foreign Office.” According to former EU commissioner Chris Patten, this led to 
an increased will to use military power.76 Udgaard describes a pattern of a more 
active office of the prime minister now seen in a number of EU-member 
countries.  
                                                 
74  Government.no,The Structure of the Office of the PMIN, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/smk/The-Office-of-the-Prime-Minister/Organisation.html?id=899 
(accessed July 5, 2007). 
75 In Fonn, 52. 
76 Fonn, 55. 
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As Figure 5 shows, the Norwegian Office of the Prime Minister has no 
executing elements in its organization, whether directorates, agencies, or 
institutions. This is in keeping with § 2.5 of the Constitution which stipulates that 
the execution of the Government’s politics is related to the individual minister, not 
the Government itself or the Prime Minister. In the constitutional context, 
therefore, the prime minister is not a minister per se, but the head of a Collegium 
of Ministers. Thus, according to current constitutional customs, it is unfeasible to 
attach any national strategic intelligence service to either the Prime Minister or 
his office. According to the structure of the Office, it has no formal connection to 
the intelligence community, neither a liaison nor an analysis element. 
2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
This section will describe the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ role in Norway’s 
foreign policy and review that policy’s recent history. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ mission is to contribute to 
Norwegian national foreign policy, in order to secure our freedom, 
security, and welfare. Norway’s interests are determined by our 
location in a strategic area, our open economy, our position as a 
coastal power and manager of huge marine resources, our 
extensive export of oil and gas . . . The MoFA is also contributing to 
the promotion of peace and security, an international legal system, 
a fair international economic order, and sustainable development.77 
Thus, for a small nation with only 4.5 million people, but a strategic geopolitical 
position, the main goals of the MoFA are extensive. Over the last thirty-plus 
years the changing governments and coalitions have supported the priorities 
listed in the above quotation, with an increasing effort since the breakdown of the 
Iron Curtain in 1989.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for coordinating the national 
foreign policy and, in this role, is recognized as a senior ministry. However, its 
responsibility in this regard has been challenged in recent years due to the 
                                                 
77 Government.no., The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Responsibilities, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/About-the-Ministry/ansvarsomraader.html?id=858 (accessed 
July 23, 2007). The homepage was changed after our research in Norway in September 2007. 
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development of international relations by a number of other ministries, especially 
significant in the Ministry of Defense. Since the early ’90s, the Government has 
used the military not only to protect the Homeland but also as a convenient 
foreign-policy tool.  
Historically speaking, Norway’s ambitions for colonization and imperialism 
were crushed in 1066 by the battle at Stanford Bridge and have never 
reoccurred. Thus, for centuries the country has acted primarily as an international 
peace negotiator. Norwegian participation in international peace talks has been 
especially visible in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, most notably with the Oslo 
agreement in 1993; in the Balkan conflicts during the early 1990s; and in Sri 
Lanka in the late ’90s, to name the most well known. Less known is the way the 
Norwegian government supported anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa, 
including with cash financial support during the late 1970s, ’80s, and early ’90s.78  
For Norwegian politicians in general it has been important to show 
solidarity with Third World countries, and for many years the political goal was to 
use more than one percent of the national budget in support of these programs. 
There has always been a strong will in Norway for contributing in the international 
struggles for peace, equality, sustainable development, and a better world.  
However, Norway’s contribution to development programs in Third World 
countries has been disputed internally because their efficiency has not always 
been faultless. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has increasingly used non-
governmental organizations to execute support programs, both on a regular 
basis and during emergency crises. During the 1990s, the separation between 




                                                 
78 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965-1995 (The Oil Age, 1965-1995) (Oslo: Universitesforlaget, 
1997). Tamnes’s book is volume 6 of the official history of Norwegian foreign policy. Rolf Tamnes 
is a well-respected Norwegian historian and has written a number of articles and books. He is an 
Adjunct Professor in Modern history at the University in Oslo. 
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become increasingly blurred. As Tamnes shows, that blurring is evidenced in the 
creation of new terms such as “expanded security” and “expanded development 
support.”79 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the largest ministry in Norway, was 
established in 1905. As Figure 6 shows, it is divided into eight departments, and 
104 Foreign Service missions.80 The departments are dually organized according 
to subject and region, which may seem confusing but is historically grounded. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also has close relations to a number of research 
institutions. The responsibility for Norway’s foreign policy is divided among four 
departments. The MoFA has no counterpart to the U.S. Department of State‘s 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research. And, as was expressed in Report #37 for 
2004–05 to the Storting, the ministry has been criticized in recent years for being 
old-fashioned and having little flexibility.81 The MoFA has only one subordinate 
directorate, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD). 
Thus, overall, this author believe that today’s structure is not relevant to handling 
a subordinated “foreign intelligence service.” 
 
                                                 
79 Tamnes, Oljealder, 445. 
80 Government.no., The Structure of MoFA, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/org.html?id=857 (accessed July 29, 2007). 
81 Government.no, Stortingsmelding #37 (2004-2005), available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/regpubl/stmeld/20042005/Stmeld-nr-37-2004-2005-
.html?id=198889&showdetailedtableofcontents=true (accessed July 29, 2007). 
  37
 
Figure 6.   The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Internal Structure82 
 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) is an active player in the UN, the 
EU, NATO, and other multi- and bilateral forums in the international struggle 
against terror.83 It is the primary department for handling international crises as, 
for example, 9/11/01 in the United States, 11/3/04 in Madrid, and 7/7/05 in 
London. 
In the relevant available literature, there is little mention of a relationship 
between either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Norwegian Intelligence 
Service and the Norwegian Police Security Service as a provider of unbiased 
information for ministry analysis. Nor is there any recognition of a formal 
organizational link between the MoFA and the NIS. Nonetheless, Foreign Affairs 
representatives consider the Norwegian Intelligence Service as a “foreign 
intelligence service,” in addition to their military responsibilities. Their relationship 
is assessed as relevant and sufficient. When needed, the Ministry can 
communicate directly with the NIS, and thus inform the Ministry of Defense. Both 
                                                 
82 Government.no., The Structure of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
83 Government.no., The Norwegian Foreign Policy to Combat Terrorism, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/Sikkerhetspolitikk/ Terrorisme.html?id=86762 
(accessed May 29, 2007). 
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the NIS and the NPSS contribute to MoFA country studies.84 These direct 
communications, when approved by the Defense Ministry, are in accordance with 
the Royal Instructions for NIS.85  
To assist the Minister of Foreign Affairs if a foreign crisis should occur, a  
Readiness Committee was established. Though headed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the committee has representatives from the Office of the Prime 
Minister; the Ministries of Defense, Justice, and Health Care; the Norwegian 
Directorates of Police, Police Security Services, and Intelligence Services; and 
the Directorates for Civil Defense and Emergency Planning and of Customs and 
Excise. The frequency of meetings depends on the occurrence of international 
crisis events such as the 2004 Madrid terrorist attacks. 
3. The Ministry of Defense  
This section will describe the Ministry of Defense’s role in Norway’s 
national security and defense policies and the historical relationship between the 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
The Ministry of Defense forms and implements Norway’s security 
and defense policies. It has an overarching responsibility to instruct 
and control subordinate agencies’ activities . . . Every forth year the 
ministry makes a report to the Storting that outlines the long-term 
development of Norwegian defense. The report also analyzes the 
security policy and lays out the armed forces’ roles and missions as 
the most important instrument of the Norwegian security policy.86  
In 1990, after the end of the Cold War, for a nation with a relatively small 
population, Norway had a significant armed force, although one that functioned 
mostly as mobilization forces. At the time, they were focused primarily on 
providing a defense against an attack from the USSR on either Norway or 
                                                 
84 Interview with Senior Adiser Jon Erik Stroemo at the MoFA, Septemer 3, 2007. 
85 Royal Instructions for NIS, §16, available from http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-
wift/ldles?doc=/sf/sf/sf-20010831-1012.html. (accessed August 5, 2007). 
86 Government.no, MoD Responsibilities, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fd/The-Ministry/ansvarsomraader.html?id=405 (accessed July 
23, 2007). 
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another NATO country in keeping with the Warsaw Treaty. During the past fifteen 
years, however, the Norwegian Armed Forces underwent a dramatic change and 
downsizing. As a result, the army is now down to less than two brigades. This 
restructuring and a general change in the global political environment led to a 
related change in the focus of the Ministry of Defense. According to Graeger and 
Neumann, the changes challenged the historical structure that had subordinated 
Norway’s defense policy to its foreign policy.87 Deciding which ministry would 
have the greatest focus and effect on the security policy has often depended on 
the minister. However, today, the Department of Security Policy in the Ministry of 
Defense is bigger than its counterpart in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.88 A 
civilian director-general heads the Department of Security Policy and has close 
ties through the Chief of Defense to the Norwegian Intelligence Service. On the 
political side, however, unlike their counterparts in the United States, no direct or 
formal ties exist between the political staff and the Norwegian Intelligence 
Service. Thus, in Norway, for example, there is no Undersecretary of Defense for 
Intelligence.   
 
Figure 7.   The Ministry of Defense: Main Structure 
                                                 
87 Fonn; Nina Graeger, and Ivar Neuman, “MoFA and MoD as Political Decision-making 
Actors.” Neumann is Adjunct Professor at the University in Oslo and a well-respected researcher, 
both in Norway and internationally. Graeger presented her doctoral dissertation on the 
internationalization of the Norwegian defense, August 17, 2007. 
88 Fonn, 76. 
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Reorganizing the Armed Forces meant in effect a reorganization of the 
entire strategic structure. In 2002, for instance, the Storting decided to reduce the 
size of both the Ministry of Defense and the Defense High Command and to 
merge the two elements into a new integrated defense ministry. As the MoD Web 
site puts it, “The Ministry of Defense represents the political management and is 
responsible for the shaping and execution of the Norwegian security and defense 
policy.”89  
The Chief of Defense is both the senior adviser to the minister and the 
head of Norway’s Armed Forces, for which he is assigned a Defense Staff. 
During the merger into an integrated defense ministry, the Security and Policy 
Department in the Ministry of Defense was reinforced. Obviously, the decision 
that the Ministry of Defense will contribute to the shaping of Norway’s security 
policy is both ambitious and taken very seriously. The merging of the former Joint 
Defense High Command into the MoD also made the Chief of Defense less 
visible as the head of the Armed Forces, and his staff is now seen mostly as 
administrative in function. 
The quote from the MoD Web site illustrates not only a potential for 
conflicts of interest between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, but also a significant change of roles for the Armed Forces overall. The 
Armed Force, once the key actor in the defense of Norwegian territory, as 
stipulated by Norway’s defense policy, is now largely an actor in foreign policy. 
Not surprisingly, such major shifts have had an impact both on the internal 
structure of the Ministry of Defense and on its ambitions and goals for the future. 
Since the mid 1990s, the defense ministry has limited its international 
military engagement mostly to U.S.-led NATO operations in as few locations as 
possible. This policy has been justified mainly by the economics involved and by 
the need to operate with partners committed to assisting Norway in turn if a 
                                                 
89 Minsitry of Defense: Area of Responsibilities, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dep/ansvarsomraader.html?id=405 (accessed October 24, 
2007). 
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military crisis should occur there. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, takes 
a different view. It considers the use of Norway’s military forces as a function of 
UN operations in as many locations as possible. So far, it is the defense 
ministry’s view that has been executed.90  
The disappearance of any distinction being made between peace and 
situations other than war has periodically created new tension between the 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Justice and Police concerning both their 
tasks and their funding. The Directorate of Police in the Ministry of Justice and 
Police used the media to promote a transfer of tasks and funding from the 
defense ministry to the Ministry of Justice. However, by 2007, most of the 
challenges at the political and senior levels had been sorted out, and relations 
between the ministries were characterized as constructive and efficient.  
The improved relations were evidenced in March of that year by a joint 
article by the Minister of Defense and the Minster of Justice and Police in 
Dagbladet, Norway’s third largest newspaper, which self-identifies as a liberal 
paper.91 Although the heading, “Intelligence in Our Time,” was almost the same 
as one published by Professor Riste in December 2006, it focused primarily on 
the appropriate relationship between Norway’s two main intelligence agencies, 
the Intelligence Service and the Police Security Service. That same day, a plan 
for a joint analytical element between the two services was introduced at a joint 
press conference. As explained in the Dagbladet article,    
It is exactly this difference [between the NIS and the NPSS] that 
makes it more important to cooperate for an optimal utilizing of the 
resources. The threat is more diffuse than ever, and frequently we 
cannot see what the border between internal and external 
[intelligence] veils.92  
                                                 
90 Boerresen, 234. 
91 Anne-Grete Strøm-Erichsen, and Knut Storberget, “Etterretning i vår tid” (Intelligence in 
Our Time), Dagbladet (March 9 2007), available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dep/Justisminister_Knut_Storberget/taler_artikler/2007/Etterr
etning-i-var-tid.html?id=456975 (accessed March 12, 2007).  
92 Strøm-Erichsen and Storberget. 
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The Ministry of Defense regulates the focus of the Norwegian Intelligence 
Service through an annual classified publication.93 Some have argued that the 
document should be coordinated with the whole Government and should indicate 
the total national intelligence needs for the coming year. As it stands at present, 
the Minister of Defense gives the document to the Chief of Defense as 
instructions, which the Chief then executes through the NIS. It is not known how 
this fulfills the needs of the other ministries involved in Norway’s foreign and 
security policies.  
In any event, it is the main task of the High Level Council, the 
Høynivågruppen, to ensure that information collected by the Intelligence Service 
also supports other important govermental needs. The membership of the 
Council, headed by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense, consists of 
the Secretary Generals of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Justice and Police, the Chief of Defense, and the Director of 
the Norwegian Defense Research Institute.94  
Between the Minister of Defense and the Intelligence Service there is an 
NIS Coordination Committee (Koordineringsutvalget for Etterretningstjenesten, or 
K-utvalget), headed by the Ministry Secretary General. Among the members are 
the Director of NIS, the Chief of Defense, and a representative from the General 
Accounting Office. In addition to overseeing the activities and finances of the 
NIS, the committee also considers issues to be introduced to the Government 
Security Council.95 
                                                 
93 Royal Instructions for NIS, §12. 
94 Odeltingsproposisjon #50 (1996-97), Remarks to the Public Act of Intelligence: MoDs 
remarks to the proposal to the Storting, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dok/regpubl/otprp/19961997/Otprp-nr-50-1996-97-
.html?id=158595 (accessed February 26, 2007).  
95 Odeltingsproposisjon #50 and Document #15, The Lund Commission, 495-498. 
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The Ministry of Defense has a total budget of NKR 30.989 billion, about 
US$ 5.17 billion.96 Over the last ten years the budget has remained relatively 
constant, which has resulted in a significant down-sizing of the Armed Forces. 
4. The Ministry of Justice and Police 
Historically, the Ministry of Justice and Police was not seen as an actor in 
formulating Norway’s foreign policy. But the great changes in the international 
political environment since 1990 have influenced and affected this. The next 
section will describe the role that the justice and police sector now have in the 
decision-making process concerning Norway’s foreign policy, including the 
security services’ support.  
The national budget (Stortingsproposisjon #1, or St.prop 1) for the Ministry 
of Justice indicates the Ministry’s main focus and the relevant issues involved in 
achieving its goals.  
Main goal: To increase the security of Norwegian society: 
• Increase the society’s ability to prevent crises, disasters, and 
deficiencies in its critical functions  
• Increase the society’s ability to handle extraordinary 
situations that can cause risks for individuals, the 
environment, and material damage 
• Oversee the maintenance of Norway’s security and 
independence and protect the substantial interests of the 
society97 as a whole. 
Within the Ministry of Justice are a number of subordinate departments, 
directorates, and agencies that execute its policies. The most significant are 
shown in Figure 8. 
                                                 
96 Stortingsproposisjon #1, The Budget for the MoD for 2007, available from 
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Figure 8.   Ministry of Justice and Police: Main Internal Structure 
 
In Norway, the national police agency responsible for fighting organized 
and other more serious crime is KRIPOS. The agency responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting economic and environmental crime is 
OEKOKRIM.98 At present, due to the development of border-crossing crime and 
the connection between crime and terrorism, the police agencies have an 
increasing relationship with the Norwegian Police Security Service (NPSS). 
Unlike the United States, in Norway , fighting domestic terror is seen as a part of 
fighting crime. Thus, the Ministry of Justice and Police has the superior 
responsibility both for domestic preparations against terror and for combating it. 
Previous challenges between ministries include the overarching command 
relations of the military and law enforcement authorities in situations in which war 
has not been declared and support from the Armed Forces to handle crises. 
According to the revised Royal Instructions of 2003, these areas were improved 
through restructuring and few problems are now seen.99  
                                                 
98 Stortingsproposisjon #1, MoJ, 94. 
99 Royal Instructions: Regulations concerning the Norwegian Armed Forces support to the 
Police, FOR 2003-02-28 nr 220 (Instruks om Forsvarets bistand til politiet), available from 
http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/ldles?doc =/for/ff-20030228-0220.html (accessed February 15, 
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To assist in its handling of terrorism and sabotage, the Ministry of Justice 
and Police has a Consultative Council (Den Rådgivende Stab) for support. The 
Council, headed by the Director General of the Police Department, consists of 
representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Norwegian Police Security 
Service, the Chief of Defense, and others when necessary.100 Today, the local 
Commissioners of Police – as of 2007, there were twenty-seven – have the 
overall responsibility to execute operations in their districts, including handling 
terror-related activity. The Norwegian Armed Forces assists the police when 
required by the local Police Commissioner via the Ministry of Justice to the 
Ministry of Defense. 
No similar intelligence instruction document exists between the Ministry of 
Justice and the Police Security Service for the latter’s effort as viewed by the 
Ministry and the Chief of Defense or the Chief and the Intelligence Service. 
However, the Security Service receives its directions in a yearly letter of 
instruction as part of the yearly budgetary process.101 For 2007, the Ministry of 
Justice had a budget of NKR 16.6 billion, or US$ 2.75 billion. 
5. The Ministry of the Treasury  
Although at present, the relationship is not significant, this author believe 
that the Ministry of the Treasury will have an increasing role in and connection 
with the intelligence community in the future, and thus include it in the thesis. For 
our purposes, the Treasury’s most significant role, given its contribution to the 
National Budget for 2007 (Stortingsproposisjon #1), is its “contribution to the fight 
against tax evasion and other economic crimes.”102 This aspect of the Treasury  
 
 
                                                 
100 NOU:24, 26. 
101 E-mail to the author from Senior Adviser Atle Tangen, NPSS, October 17, 2007. 
102 Regjering.no., Stortingsproposisjon nr 1 (2006-2007), The National Budget for 2007, 
MoT, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/STP/20062007/001FIN/PDFS/STP200620070001FINDDDPDFS.
pdf (accessed Aug. 1, 2007). 
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is also emphasized in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs document, the Foreign Policy 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, in which terrorism financing is an important 
issue.  
While the Norwegian Treasury has a number of subordinate agencies, for 
example, the Directorate of Customs and Excise, it has no counterpart to the 
U.S. Department of Treasury’s Terrorism and Financial Intelligence department. 
6. Other Ministries  
The Norwegian Government includes thirteen other ministries, in addition 
to those already discussed. Those most relevant to the thesis are: 
• The Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, which oversees the 
extensive Norwegian economic zone.  
• The Ministry of the Environment which is concerned with issues such 
as: nuclear proliferation and waste, and pollution challenges in relation 
to the neighborhood of Russia, and the political will to be  an actor in 
international sustainable development.  
• The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, which is of extreme importance, 
given that Norway is a significant producer of oil and gas, with huge 
development interests around the world. 
7. Other Key Supporters of the Government Decision-making 
Process   
a. The Government Security Council, or GSC 
(Regjeringens sikkerhetsutvalg or RSU) 
The GSC consists of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, Justice and Police, and Treasure.103 
 
                                                 
103 No further details known. 
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b. The Committee for Coordination and Advice, or CCA  
(Kooridnerings-og rådgivingsutvalget, or KRU) 
The establishment of the Committee for Coordination and Advice in 
1977 formalized relations between the Norwegian Intelligence Service, the 
Norwegian Police Security Service, and the Norwegian Security Authority. The 
Royal Instruction of December 20, 2002, was last revisited in 2004.  
 
 
Figure 9.   The Committee for Coordination and Advice 
 
According to the establishing Act, the CCA is an advisory body to 
the key ministers. As Figure 9 shows, it consists of a senior government official 
from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice and the directors of 
the three secret services. The CCA’s main task is “to execute over-arching 
coordination between the three services, their tasks, priorities, and goals, 
together with analyzing and reporting on challenges related to the threat 
assessment.”104 The CCA has a permanent secretariat that rotates between the 
Ministries, and does not execute any intelligence analysis itself. It is reasonable 
to compare the CCA to the U.S. Joint Intelligence Community Council, although it 
does not have the same widespread missions.  Representatives from the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice and the Intelligence Service have said 
that the Committee is a well-working support element.105 
                                                 
104 Royal Instruction for the Committee for Coordination and Advice, available from: 
http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/ldles?ltdoc=/for/ff-20021220-1699.html (accessed August 4, 2007). 
105 Interview with Senior Adviser Jan Erik Stromo in MoFA, Special Adviser Sigbjoern Saloer 
in MoJ, and Head of Section Sigve Oekland in NIS, in Oslo, Norway, 2007. 
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In Norway, there is no unified requirement or priority document 
covering all the intelligence services, and no agency, department, or institution 
has been tasked to prepare one. When the tasking in the respective Public Acts 
and Royal Instructions do not cover some aspect, the CCA is the agency that is 
supposed to monitor such coordination. 
c. Afghanistan Forum 
This is a cross-ministry forum for the Secretaries of the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice, and the Office of the Prime, where the 
common challenges to Norwegian interests in Afghanistan can be discussed. A 
similar forum focused on Norwegian interests in Sudan is currently in the 
planning stages.106 
D. STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ACTORS 
1. The Norwegian Intelligence Service 
a. History 
Creation of a Norwegian strategic intelligence service began in 
London during the Second World War. During the summer of 1940, when the 
Norwegian government was established in exile in London, an intelligence 
bureau was attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the end of that year, 
the intelligence activities were transferred to a similar bureau in the Ministry of 
Defense, and “A fully fledged military intelligence service began to be build up 
from the winter of 1942.”107  
In 1942, the Norwegian Joint Defense High Command was 
implemented. Consequently, the defense ministry’s intelligence unit merged with 
the existing military effort to form what was then called “the Second Bureau of the 
                                                 
106 Espen Barth Eide (August 31, 2007), Challenges in the Norwegian Defense Policy, 
speech to the Total Defense course, August 31, 2007, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dep/politisk_ledelse/Statssekretar_Espen_Barth_Eide/taler_a
rtikler/2007/Utfordringer-i-norsk-forsvarspolitikk-.html?id=481025 (accessed September 17, 
2007). 
107 O. Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service 1945-1970 (London: Frank Cass), 2. 
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Defense High Command (FO II). The merger was motivated especially by the 
government’s need for reliable information from occupied Norway and its 
decision to contribute to the Allied war effort against the Germans. The 
Norwegian government’s “will” to keep Norway’s intelligence assets under its 
control was important both for the exile government in London and later 
governments as well.  
It was Colonel Roscher Lund, who was the current director of 
intelligence, who recommended in 1946 that two separate intelligence 
organizations be established, one within the military structure and one directly 
subordinate to the Minister of Defense. The latter was justified by the estimated 
need to support three ministries – Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice – in 
addition to routine military demands. That same year, Col. Lund left office to 
support the Norwegian UN Secretary General, Trygve Lie. And, as the end of the 
Second World War in 1945 gave way to the so-called Cold War, Norway’s 
proximity to the USSR justified a very considerable growth in its intelligence 
services. 
Over the years, the Norwegian Intelligence Service has 
experienced a number of investigations and minor reorganizations. One occurred 
in a two-year period, 1989–1990, directed by the Karstad Commission, headed 
by Arne Karstad, the State Secretary to the Ministry of Defense at the time. Their 
report is classified Top Secret (NOFORN), however, and thus not accessible.108 
But according to a recent book (2204) G. Boerresen’s Norwegian Defense 
History, the commission studied the intelligence services’ “procedures, 
organization, and management” and “suggested that a non-military intelligence 
service was given the highest priority.” Due to an “increasing awareness 
concerning the vulnerability of the society,” the report concluded “that the civil 
part of the government – which had little experience in the utilization of 
                                                 
108 Boeressen, G. Gjeseth, and R. Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistore (Norwegian Defense 
History) (Bergen: Eide Forlag 2004), 404. 
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intelligence – would [also] need such support.”109 That was an interesting 
conclusion, given that the report was made just after the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain, and thus before the rise of the terrorist threat and today’s challenges. 
For the next sixteen years, there was little discussion in the media concerning the 
use of intelligence to inform and support civilian decisions.  
In the post–WWII era (1947–1967), the relation between the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service and the Police Security Service became 
increasingly strained. The Director of the NPSS even wrongly arrested the 
secretary to the Director of the NIS. In the late sixties, both directors were 
replaced, and relations between the agencies became more constructive and 
positive.  
Prior to 1965, Norway’s national security (i.e., military) matters were 
handled by the Norwegian Intelligence Service. But in 1965, a Security Staff was 
established as an independent unit of the Joint Defense High Command. This 
organization will be described in a later section. 
b. Legislation and Objectives 
In 1996, another report, this time by the Lund Commission ended 
the period with investigations and accusations of all three secret services.110 As 
a result, in 1998, the Storting passed the Public Act for the NIS, which covers 
times of peace and an “absence of war,” but can in wartime be adjusted 
accordingly. Although the NIS is a military intelligence service, the Public Act was 
intended to make it serve also as a foreign intelligence service with certain 
specific goals: 
The NIS shall collect, evaluate, and analyze information concerning 
Norwegian interests in relation to foreign countries, organizations, 
and individuals. With this platform, it will compile threat warnings 
and intelligence estimates, to the extent it can contribute to 
securing the vital interests of the society, including:  
                                                 
109 Boeressen, 277.  This is the only known reference to the Karstad report. 
110 Document #15 to the Norwegian Parliament. 
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• the shaping of Norwegian foreign, defense, and security 
policies  
• the obtaining of information about international terrorism 
• the obtaining of information about border-crossing 
environmental challenges 
• the obtaining of information concerning proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction111 
The Public Act was followed by a Royal Instruction in 2001 which 
stated: 
The MoD, through the Chief of Defense, gives tasks, executes the 
daily contact and cooperation with, and executes political guidance 
and control with NIS. . . . The MoD can establish procedures to 
ensure communication and cooperation with other ministries and 
institutions that require information obtained from the Service.112 
The organization charts of the NIS, which have developed through 
the years are shown in Figure 10, which shows how the collection of intelligence 
is separated from analysis and reporting. The NIS produces all-source products, 
compiled from different collection assets, in contrast to the UK, where this is 
done in the UK Joint Intelligence Cell (JIC) at the Cabinet Office. 
In Norway, the technical collection and evaluation of data is 
organized within the NIS and subordinated to the Chief of Defense. In the United 
States, the NIS technical and collection counterpart, the Norwegian National 
Security Agency, is organized as an independent agency subordinated directly 
under the Secretary of Defense. In the UK, the British NIS counterpart, the 
Government Communications Headquarters, is an independent agency 
subordinated to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (Minister of Foreign 
Affairs). 
                                                 
111 Public Act for the Norwegian Intelligence Servic (LOV 1998-03-20 nr 11; Lov om 
Etterretningstjenesten), §3, available from http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19980320-011.html  
(accessed Feb, 19, 2007). 
112 Royal Instruction for NIS,  §16. 
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Figure 10.   Organization Chart - NIS113 
 
As for the agency responsible for human collection of information, 
in Norway this aspect is organized within the NIS. In the United States, it is the 
responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency, subordinated to the President’s 
National Security Council. In the UK, it is handled by the Secret Intelligence 
Service, which is subordinate to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, 
comparable to the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
Since 1996, Norway’s contribution to U.S.- and NATO-led 
operations has resulted in increased demands on the Intelligence Service to 
support those tactical military operations. This increase was implemented 
according to the Royal Instructions.114 At present, because of the increase in its 
military involvements, Norway, like many other countries, is experiencing a high 
level of political and public concern for the well-being of the troops. Given that 
context, some argue that whatever detailed question the Prime Minster asks 
concerning individual soldiers, it is a more general “strategic” question that will  
 
 
                                                 
113 Described in Aftenposten, and confirmed in an E-mail from NIS to the author November 
7, 2007. 
114 Royal Instruction for NIS §9. 
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attract the attention of the strategic intelligence agencies. This author will argue 
that such questions should be handled at a lower level, and within the military 
services. 
Today, the NIS is an integral part of the Defense Chief’s assets and 
therefore is included in all campaign planning. However, it is unclear whether the 
emphasis on tactical focus tends to draw resources away from the strategic 
support element. In respect to the military’s tactical needs, it is noteworthy that 
during the last few years the different services have improved their collection and 
analytical capabilities significantly. Tactical intelligence is now given high priority 
in the overall structure of the armed forces.115 In an interesting article about the 
reorganization of the U.S. intelligence community, Larry Kindsvater has recently 
pointed out the challenge facing countries to balance intelligence resources 
between strategic and tactical needs.116 
Norway’s Intelligence Service budget has been restructured several 
times. According to current records of the national budget for 2007, the NIS was 
allocated NKR 851 million (US$ 142 million), about 2.7 percent of the entire 
defense budget. This percentage allotment has remained relatively stable since 
2001.117  
c. The NIS: General Information  
Cooperation between the Norwegian Intelligence Service and the 
Norwegian Police Security Service has become increasingly close in the post–
9/11 era. In October 2006, the government passed Royal Instructions for 
                                                 
115 Ministry of Defense, The Further Modernization of the Norwegian Armed Forces, 2005–
2008 (Stortingsproposisjon nr 42, 2003–2004), approved by the Council of State, March 12, 
2004), 56. 
116 Larry Kindsvater, “The Need to Reorganize the Intelligence Community,” in R. George,  
ed., 59. 
117 Stortingsproposisjon #1, The National Budget for MoD for 2001 and 2007, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dok/regpubl/stprp/20062007/Stprp-nr-1-2006-2007-
.html?id=298194 and http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dok/regpubl/stprp/20002001/st-prp-nr-
1_2000-2001/7.html?id=203692 (accessed July 31, 2007). 
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extended cooperation between the two services.118 On March 9, 2007, 
government recognition of the vanishing separation between internal and 
external terrorist and terror-related activities was publicly acknowledged in a joint 
op-ed article in the newspaper, Dagbladet, by the Ministers of Justice and Police 
and Defense,119 and by a press conference held at NIS headquarters same 
day.120 There, the ministers also presented plans for a future joint anti-terrorism 
analytical center.  
2. The Norwegian Police Security Service 
a. History121 
The pioneers of today’s Norwegian Police Security Service began 
in the capital, Oslo, in 1936–1937. Their first Royal Instruction from the Ministry 
of Justice and Police was given in 1937 and focused mainly on 
counterintelligence. 
The Service, dormant during the years of Norway’s German 
occupation, reemerged in 1947, with the growing threat from the Communist 
bloc. The USSR’s joint border with Norway meant an increase in Russian 
espionage. 
As international terrorist activity swelled in Europe during the 
seventies, both from the extreme left and the extreme right, the NPSS redirected 
some of its resources in response. During the nineties, other areas of focus 
arose: weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation. At present and for 
                                                 
118 Royal Instructions for coperation between NPSS and NIS (FOR 2006-10-13 nr 1151: 
Instruks om samarbeid mellom Etterretningstjenesten og Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste), available 
from http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/ldles?doc=/sf/sf/sf-20061013-1151.html (accessed May 30, 
2007). 
119 Knut Storberget and Anne-Grete Stroem-Erichsen, Intelligence in Our Time. 
120 Government.no., Minister of Justice and the Police, press release no.24, published March 
9, 2007: “Closer relations between NSP and NIS” (Tettere samarbeid mellom PST og E-
tjenesten), available from http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/jd/Press-
Center/pressemeldinger/2007/Tettere-samarbeid-mellom-PST-og-E-tjenes.html?id=456976 
(accessed May 30, 2007). 
121 PST.POLITIET.NO; The history of NPSS. Available from  http://www.pst.politiet.no/default3.aspx 
(accessed Oct 23, 2007). 
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the near future, the Police Security Service’s top priority will be its contribution to 
the fight against international terrorism. 
In the final years of the 1990s and the early years of 2000, the 
NPSS went through a turbulent time, which led to some restructuring. It has its 
main office, the Central Organization, in Oslo, and is supported by local offices 
collocated and led by local police commissionaires. Over the years, various 
organization charts were developed.  
The NPSS has been the subject of numerous government 
accusations, which terminated with the Lund commission. As was the case with 
the Norwegian Intelligence Service, during the last ten year, the Police Security 
Service has been the focus of new legislation. One result was that it experienced 
a major reorganization, that took effect in January 2002. 
b. Legislation and Objectives 
Part of the Lund Commission’s investigation centered on the 
Norwegian Police Security Service’s history. Since the Norwegian Intelligence 
Service was defined and regulated by a singular Public Act, many thought that 
the NPSS should be also. However, that did not occur. Instead, the Public Act for 
the Police Force (Politiloven) was changed to accommodate the NPSS’s 
restructuring.122 A Royal Instruction emphasizing the tasks stipulated in the 
Public Act followed, which stated:123 
The Norwegian Police Security Service shall prevent and 
investigate: 
• Illegal intelligence activity 
                                                 
122 Changes in the Public Act for the Police Force concerning the Police Security Service 
(Lov om endringer i politiloven mv; Overvåkingstjenestens oppgaver mv), available from 
http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/ldles?ltdoc=/all/nl-20010615-054.html (accessed August 5, 2007), 
§17. 
123 Royal Instruction for NPSS, available from http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-
wift/ldles?ltdoc=/for/ff-20050819-0920.html (accessed May 30, 2007). 
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• Proliferation of WMD and equipment and technology for  
their production  
• Sabotage and politically funded violence 
The Ministry of Justice will decide if the NPSS shall be given 
responsibility for fighting organized crime, crimes against humanity, 
genocide, and aggravated war crimes.  
The Central Organization of the NPSS shall: 
• develop threat warnings for use by Norway’s political 
decision-makers 
• cooperate with the police, security, and intelligence services 
of foreign countries. 
Figure 11 shows the internal structure of the NPSS today. Like the 
NIS, the NPSS is both a collection service and an analysis and reporting service. 
 
 





                                                 
124 PST.POLITIET.NO, NPSS Management, available from 
http://www.pst.politiet.no/PST/Templates/EmployeeList136.aspx (accessed October 
25, 2007).   
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It is not possible to extract the budget of the NPSS from the 
national budget. However, in 2006, the Minister of Justice and Police announced 
that, for 2007, the Central Organization of the NPSS was allocated NKR 260 
million (US$ 43.3 million).125 
c. The NPSS: General Information  
Although the police force in Norway is generally seen as a law 
enforcement agency, the Police Security Service has more extensive tasks. It is 
a special police service directly subordinate to the Ministry of Justice and Police. 
The NPSS also has expanded tools that increase its ability to fight terrorism and 
to execute its intelligence-gathering responsibilities.126 The Service produces two 
annual reports of threat warnings, a classified version for the Minister of Justice 
and Police, and an unclassified version for the public. In addition to the yearly 
threat warnings, others are made on occasion, depending on national and 
international situations. In contrast to what occurs between the Ministry of 
Defense and the Intelligence Service, no document covering intelligence 
priorities connects the Ministry of Justice and the Police Security Service. In the 
United States, the NPSS counterpart is the FBI and the Department of Homeland 
Security; in the U.K., it is the Security Service.  
3. The Norwegian Security Authority (NSA) 
The forerunner of the Norwegian Security Authority was the Security Staff 
within Norway’s Joint Defense High Command. In January 2003, the NSA was 
established as an independent government directorate within the Ministry of 
Defense. It also has a professional responsibility to the Ministry of Justice and  
 
                                                 
125 E-mail from the Norwegian Police Security Service to the author, August 3, 2007. This is 
the first time NPSS figures were made public. 
126 Public Police Act, August 4, 1995,  Chap. IIIA, NSP, The Organization, Missions, and 
Preemptive Use of Forcible Means, available from http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-19950804-053-
005.html (accessed May 30, 2007). 
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Police. The NSA was the third Norwegian security service to be established.127 
Its focus is preventive security for the government and its institutions. The NSA 
will not be discussed further in this thesis. 
E.  SUMMARY  
This chapter has described the key actors in Norway’s decision-making 
process and their strategic intelligence support agencies. We have focused on  
the government’s foreign and security policies and the links between it and the 
strategic intelligence actors, as shown in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.   Interrelationship between Norway’s Executive Power and the 
intelligence services 
 
To understand the Norwegian political environment, it is important to see 
the close interrelationship between the legislative power, the Storting, and the 
executive power, the Government. Generally, the Government presents and 
discusses major challenges in the nation’s foreign policy with the Enlarged 
Foreign Affairs Committee in the Storting to obtain majority support. This general 
practice does not prevent them, however, from having intense discussions about 
particular policy concerns. 
Communication between the Storting and the Government administration 
is conducted by individual ministers. To address any of the various institutions 
                                                 
127 Norwegian Security Agency official website, http://www.nsm.stat.no/ (accessed August 4, 
2007). 
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and agencies, the Storting address the appropriate minister. To date, apparently, 
the Storting has seen no need for a Standing Committee on Intelligence. 
Coordinating Norway’s foreign policy is a challenge, especially now that it 
increasingly also influences domestic policies. There will probably always be a 
conflict of interest concerning influence between the ministries and personalities 
in the Government, especially in a coalition government. However, a country’s 
foreign policy must be well coordinated by the government, as this author assess 
Norway’s is, for the main part. This author will however, argue that the 
importance of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
should be more significant, at the expense of the other departments.  
Norway’s intelligence community is small, consisting of only three 
services, of which only two are collection and analysis agencies. This structuring 
makes the Norwegian intelligence community more transparent than, for 
example, that of the United States. There is no civilian intelligence agency and 
no one minister or institution is responsible for providing national intelligence 
support for the government. The Norwegian Intelligence Service is part of the 
Norwegian Armed Forces, instead of being directly subordinate to the Minister of 
Defense, which make its connection to the government somewhat more distant. 
In Norway, neither the Prime Minister nor his Office has an intelligence body 
connected to it to ensure a direct connection between the executive power and 
its intelligence supporters, as is the case for the U.S. President and the UK’s 
Office of the Prime Minister, 
Today, relations between the strategic intelligence actors can be 
characterized as constructive. However, their respective legislations give no 
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IV.  NORWAY’S FOREIGN POLICY 
This chapter will describe Norway’s foreign policy, the threats the country 
faces, and the reasons the intelligence services should be more essential actors 
in the decision-making process. 
  
Figure 13.   The inter-intelligence relations 
 
Figure 13 illustrates the integral role of Norway’s security affairs in its 
foreign policy. Figure 14 shows the various ministries that are involved in forming 
and implementing the nation’s foreign policy. Although its national defense 
strategies are an essential part of Norway’s security policy,128 there are other 
ministries also involved. A key actor in a nation’s security is, of course, the police. 
However, the Norwegian police need for intelligence pertaining to investigation 
and prosecution is outside the policy domain. 
                                                 
128 Espen Barth Eide, speech to the Total Defense course August 31, 2007, “The Security 
Policy Has to Control the Defense Policy,”available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dep/politisk_ledelse/Statssekretar_Espen_Barth_Eide/taler_a




Figure 14.   Ministries involved in Norway’s foreign policy129 
 
A.  NATIONAL POLICIES 
1. Foreign Policy 
Foreign Policy is widely engaging a great number of researcher, and 
research institutions. This thesis is guided primarily by the following definition of 
Foreign Policy: 
A country’s foreign policy is a set of goals that seek to outline how 
that particular country will interact with other countries of the world 
and, to a lesser extent, non-state actors. Foreign policies generally 
are designed to help protect a country’s national interests, national 
security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity.130 
In other words, a country’s foreign policy should be designed, as an over-arching 
policy that focuses the direction of not only the country’s security policies, but 
also the government’s other foreign-policy activities. 
In his first regular foreign-policy brief to the Storting on September 15, 
2006, the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jonas G. Stoere, quoted the main 
goal of the Government‘s foreign policy presented in its Soria Moria Declaration. 
                                                 
129 This figure was developed by the author, given the Government’s goal for Norway’s 
foreign policy. 
130 Definition of Foreign Policy; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_policy (accessed August 
8, 2007). 
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The Norwegian foreign policy will support Norwegian interests and 
values in a rapidly changing world. At the same time, it will support 
international solidarity to build a better-organized world.131 
Though the Soria Moria Declaration is an extensive document that includes a 
number of compromises by the coalition parties, those two sentences clearly and 
concisely express its definition of the goals and perspectives of Norway’s foreign 
policy. In other words, what its foreign policy should be.  
The Government divided the Declaration’s goals according to the following 
priorities laid out in the 2007 Ministry of Foreign Affairs National Budget:  
• to execute a reinforced policy for the Barents Sea region,  
• to execute an offensive Europe policy, 
• to strengthen Norway’s contribution as a country of peace 
and to support global justice and a social sustainable 
globalization, and, furthermore, 
• to develop UN and international laws as an obligation for all 
nations.132 
In regard to those priorities, the main difference between the previous and 
current Governments is the increased focus on Norway’s territorial waters, 
including the Barents region (the High North), and on UN-led operations rather 
than those led by the United States via NATO. The Secretary to the Ministry of 
Defense reconfirmed the priorities as late as August 2007.133 In addition,  
                                                 
131 Jonas G. Goere, Foreign Policy speech to the Storting, September 15, 2006, available 
from http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dep/Utenriksminister_Jonas_Gahr_ 
Store/taler_artikler/2006/Hovedlinjene-i-regjeringens-utenrikspolitikk-Utdrag-fra-Stprp-nr-1-2006-
2007.html?id=440363 (accessed January 8, 2007). The quotation also appears in the introduction 
to the 2007 Ministry of Foreign Affairs National Budget, Stortingsproposisjon nr 1 (St.Prp. # 1), 
the Government’s key document that outlines their policy for the next year. The budget is then 
presented to the Storting, which can approve it, adjust it, or refuse it.  
132 The Soria Moria Declaration is the framework for the political parties in the Government 
to use in governing Norway (October 13, 2005), available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/smk/rap/2005/0001/ddd/pdfv/260512-regjeringsplat 
form.pdf (accessed February 15, 2007). 
133 Barth Eide, August 31, 2007.  
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs produced a strategic program for combating 
international  terrorism  (described later).  
2. Security Policy 
Today, national security policies are often based on a number of so-called 
pillars as described by countries’ foreign affairs ministries and departments.134 
Historically, this marks a dramatic change from a time when nations’ very 
existence could be in question and their security policy was therefore mainly a 
matter of national defense. Recently, the Norwegian Minister of Defense 
explained Norway’s current security policy as follows: 
The goal of the security policy is to maintain and promote basic 
national security interests. A stringent expression of such interests 
is important, especially in relation to the changing circumstances 
and security challenges. Under normal circumstances, the defense 
of the nation’s basic interests will be executed with instruments 
other than the military, but after all other instruments are 
considered, Norway must be willing to use military force to defend 
itself. 
In addition to governmental, societal, and human security, 
protection of the welfare, environment, and economic safety of the 
Norwegian population is a basic Norwegian security interest.135    
One result of this historical change in perspective is that Norway’s security policy 
has been significantly expanded to protect much more than just the state‘s 
existence. Nonetheless, forming and shaping the nation’s security policy is still 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense. 
During the last fifteen years, the Norwegian Armed Forces have 
experienced continual restructuring, reorganization, and downsizing. This has led 
to numerous reports by the Minister of Defense to the Storting concerning the 
                                                 
134 Jonas G. Goere, Foreign Policy speech to the Storting, September 15, 2006. 
135 Stortingsproposisjon # 42, 2003–2004, Ministry of Defense, The Further Modernization of 
the Norwegian Armed Forces, 2005–2008 (approved by the Council of State, March 12, 2004), 20 
(all emphasis added), 7 available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/dok/regpubl/stprp/20032004/Stprp-nr-42-2003-2004-
.html?id=208939 (accessed Aug 15, 200). 
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nation’s security policy. Some of the more important reports are those concerning 
the contribution of the Ministry of Defense to the national budget 
(Stortingsproposisjon #1, 2006–2007); the further modernization of the Armed 
Forces in 2005–2008 (Stortingsproposisjon #42, 2003–2004); and the Relevant 
Force report in 2004 describing the Strategic Concept for the Armed Forces.136 
These were all well coordinated with Norway’s security policy, and relevant parts 
of the Soria Moria Declaration incorporated in the defense ministry budget. 
The defense ministry, including its Department of Security Policy, has 
been transformed from a military actor focused on defense of Norwegian and 
NATO territory to a key actor in the development of Norway’s expanded foreign 
and security policies. The security policy, which has historically been a MoD 
responsibility, is the key platform for the design of both the defense policy and 
the future of the Norwegian Armed Forces. In this ever-changing world, the 
defense ministry continues to develop a broader, extended national security 
policy. There is no indication of how the execution of this policy is being 
coordinated with other ministries.  
The Relevant Force document introduced two new concepts into Norway’s 
ongoing security policy discussion: societal security and human security: 
Societal security concerns the safeguarding of the civilian 
population, vital societal functions, and critical infrastructure in 
situations in which the existence of the state as such is not 
threatened. This development has been accompanied by an 
increased focus on human security, an important part of societal 
security. Human security aims at protecting individuals’ human 
rights, especially the right to life and personal safety.137 
                                                 
136 The Relevant Force Report: The Strategic Concept of the Norwegian Armed Forces, 
presented by the Bondevik Government and still current, available from 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/FD/Dokumenter/Relevant_force.pdf (accessed January 30, 
2007). 
137 Relevant Force, 6-7. 
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The realization of these concepts has had a major impact on Norway’s security 
policies, evident especially in the goals of its security policy for the period 2005–
2008, defined by the Ministry of Defense:  
• to prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats 
to Norwegian and collective security; 
• to contribute to peace, stability, and the further development 
of the international rule of law; 
• to uphold Norwegian sovereignty [and] Norwegian rights and 
interests, and protect Norway’s freedom of action in the face 
of political, military, and other kinds of pressure; 
• to defend, together with our allies, Norway and NATO 
against assault and attack; and 
• to protect society against assault and attack from state and 
nonstate actors.138 
The Relevant Force report also shows the complexity of Norway’s security policy, 
the government’s will to influence the international environment, and the need for 
more of the policy instruments that were applied during the Cold War 
Security policy instruments include primarily the following [eight] 
domains: politics, the law, police enforcement, diplomacy, the 
economy, information sources, humanitarian institutions, and the 
military. Situation-specific and topical circumstances will decide 
which instruments will be applied and dominate in a given 
situation.139 
3. Defense Policy 
As the Secretary to the Minister of Defense explained in August 2007, 
Norway’s defense policy “is in the middle of its security policy and the military-
operational conditions are visible every day.”140 At present and no doubt 
continuing into the near future, the main focus of the defense part of Norway’s 
                                                 
138 The same expression occurs in both the current Government’s National Budget for the 
MoD (Stortingsproposisjon # 1, 2006-2007) and the previous Government’s Relevant Force 
Report aand the Report from the Storting Standing Committee of Defense (FKOM) No.234 
(2003–2004), , available from  http://www.stortinget.no/inns/2003/pdf/inns-200304-234.pdf 
(accessed July 10, 2007). 
 139 Relevant Force Report, 20. 
140 Barth Eide, August 31, 2007. 
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security policy will be to support with military means its foreign policies in 
conflicts far from the Norwegian mainland, in addition the protecting of the 
national interests in the Barents region, or as it also called the High North. This 
focus is clearly evident in Norway’s ongoing support with highly trained and 
professional military units of NATO- and UN-led operations. Since 1999, 
Norwegian Special Operation Force soldiers and units have also been deployed.  
In this thesis, the aspect of the Norwegian Armed Forces’ objectives that 
will be highlighted is their contribution “to safeguarding Norway’s societal 
security, to saving lives, and to limiting the consequences of accidents, 
catastrophes, assaults, and attacks from state and nonstate actors.”141 
B. THREATS 
The main actors in developing Norwegian threat assessments are, 
domestically, the Police Security Service through the Ministry of Justice and 
Police and, internationally, the Norwegian Intelligence Service through the Chief 
and Ministry of Defense.  
The Police Security Service presents an annual Threat Assessment 
pertaining to Norway and Norwegian interests abroad to the Ministry of Justice 
and Police. In addition to the classified assessment, an unclassified version is 
available to the public. Occasionally, the NPSS also presents assessments 
related to specific incidents in Norway or abroad that may have implications for 
Norwegian interests. Two examples of such incidents were the attack on the 
Norwegian Embassy in Damascus and the London underground bombings. 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 60. The Armed Forces’ defense policy objectives for 2005–2008 are that the NAF, 
within its area of responsibility and through cooperation with other national authorities, as 
appropriate, shall be able to: alone and together with Norway’s allies, secure Norwegian 
sovereignty, Norwegian rights and interests, as well as ensuring Norwegian freedom of action in 
the face of military or other pressure; together with allies, through participation in multinational 
peace operations and international defense cooperation, contribute to peace, stability, and the 
enforcement of international law and respect for human rights, and prevent the use of force by 
state and nonstate actors against Norway and NATO; together with allies, contribute to the 
collective defense of Norway and other allies in accordance with our Alliance commitments, and 
meet different kinds of assaults and attacks with force in order to safeguard Norwegian and 
collective security.  
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Together with cooperative counterpart services abroad, the Norwegian 
Intelligence Service has been a key supporter in these endeavors.142  
The Ministry of Defense has a broader view of national security, focused 
outside the national borders. Every year, the defense ministry presents an 
analysis of the security environment as part of its proposal for the national 
budget, (Stortingsproposisjon #1). For mid-term use, this is presented in a five-
year plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces. In addition, the Intelligence Service 
produces intelligence assessments according to tasks assigned it by the Ministry 
of Defense. These are normally classified, depending on their users, their 
content, and the need to protect sources. The NIS also cooperates closely with 
the Norwegian Police Security Service concerning the national threat 
assessment.143 Although the two services coordinate their assessments with 
each other, no major joint product similar to the U.S. National Intelligence 
Estimate is produced. 
1. The Norwegian Police Security Service Threat Assessment  
According to key statements in the 2007 Threat Assessment:  
There is currently no direct threat to the security of the realm. 
However, Norwegian society is exposed to several potential threats 
that, if not combated, could involve Norwegian security being 
compromised and national interests being damaged. . . . 
Supporting terrorism is the main activity carried out by individuals 
with connections to extreme Islamist networks in Norway. 
Supporting terrorism includes financing, and the forgery of identity 
documents. . . . Generally, such organizations do not present a 
direct threat to Norwegian targets. . . .  There are currently no 
indications that radicalization of individuals resident in Norway is a 
significant element in the Norwegian threat picture, although the 
radicalization process can take place very quickly.144 
 
                                                 
142 PST.POLITIET. The Norwegian Police Security Service: Our Task, 2007, available from 




2. The Ministry of Defense: Future Security Challenges  
Although Norway and its allies do not face an existential threat at present, 
there are significant threats to its societal and human security by nonstate actors 
at various levels of certain organizational structures. The situation today is 
characterized by the recent disappearance of a clear distinction between national 
and multinational environments. Despite these threats, the Norwegian 
government remains convinced that many of today’s security challenges would 
be reduced by a general betterment of living conditions around the world and by 
a stronger UN supported by its members to enforce that better world. 
Unlike in the past, Russia today does not pose a military treat to the 
mainland of Norway, and has not done so for the last decade. However, Russia 
is still Norway’s neighbor and the largest country in the world. And because of its 
increased revenues from oil exploration, the country has regained some of its old 
confidence and the will to be an actor in international politics. In the fall of 2007, a 
number of bomber flights from Russia were seen along the coast of Norway. 
 
Figure 15.   The Barents Sea Region, the High North, and Norway’s area of 
interest145 
                                                 
145 St meld # 42, 33 
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Unlike in the past, the recent developments in the Barents region with an 
activity from Russian bombers along the Norwegian coast not seen since the late 
eighties will not necessarily lead to the threat of a military invasion of Norway. 
However, the possibility of conflicts over the management of the rich recourses in 
the area, the threat posed for the environment, and future transportation routes 
will increase the challenges for both Norway’s foreign and security policies. At 
least that was the view taken by central government officials in the fall of 2007.146 
The Barents region will therefore continue to challenge Norway’s ability to 
produce a valid situational picture of the area. In its response to future 
challenges, the Norwegian Armed Forces cannot focus solely on asymmetric 
threats; it must remain vigilant to handle more traditional threats that are as yet 
unknown. 
3. Terrorism 
To reduce the risk of Norway being exposed to terrorist actions and to 
support the international effort to reduce the foundations of terrorism are two of 
the Norwegian Government’s highest priorities. In September 2006, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs presented to the Storting the Government’s strategy for 
combating international terrorism. 
Terrorism can therefore only be defeated by applying a broad range 
of measures: by improving education, fostering cultural 
understanding, and promoting development, by establishing closer 
police and judicial cooperation, and, as a last resort, by using force. 
. . . The fight against terrorism is ultimately a struggle over values. 
Our efforts to combat terrorism will only succeed if they are in full 
accordance with the principles of the rule of law and universal 
human rights.147 
As noted earlier, in its fight against terrorism, the Government is using more 
instruments than just the Norwegian Armed Forces in executing its security 
                                                 
146 Barth Eide, August 31, 2007.  
147 Government.no. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy Strategy for Combating 
Terrorism, available from http://www.regjeringen.no/ 
upload/kilde/ud/rap/2006/0124/ddd/pdfv/291587-terrorstrategi_eng.pdf. (accessed May 30, 2007). 
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policy. The long-term national goal is to reduce the risk of Norwegian interests 
being exposed to terrorist actions or being used to support terrorist acts against 
others. 
C.  STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE  
The Government’s needs regarding intelligence are different than the 
intelligence needs of the military, or the investigative and prosecution needs of 
the police. Historically, the military has primarily sought information about an 
enemy’s military capabilities and capacities. The regular police investigate 
potential lawbreakers for the ultimate purpose of prosecution. However, Norway’s 
strategic decision-makers must focus more on threatening organizations and 
nations’ intentions and probabilities. While many definitions of intelligence exist, 
for the purposes of this thesis, intelligence is best considered as a system.  
[I]ntelligence is best understood as the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information on behalf of national security decision 
makers. . . . Therefore, a high-quality intelligence process balances 
investment and direction from decision makers with unbiased 
collection and analyses.148 
This chapter has already described how Norway’s security policy, as part of 
national foreign policy, has expanded. And, as Jennifer Sims pointed out in 2005, 
such expansions also create more challenges to provide strategic decision 
makers with unbiased information.  
During the Cold War period, the intelligence services worked in an 
environment in which information was in short supply. Today, there is an overflow 
of information, some true, some mostly useless, and some false. This overflow 
creates numerous challenges, especially concerning the ability to find essential 
information and to make relevant and timely analyses concerning the future. In 
an increasingly complex world, the main challenge for intelligence services is 
                                                 
148 Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, eds., Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, 
D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2005); J. Sims, ”Understanding Friends and Enemies: The 
Context for American Intelligence Reform.” Sims served as the Department of State’s first 
coordinator for intelligence resources and planning. 
  72
their ability to present overwhelming information in a way that government 
decision makers can understand it, and use it in formulating national foreign 
policies. To achieve this, there must be absolute confidence between the 
decision makers and the intelligence services. It must never be the case in 
Norway, as it was recently in the United States, that the decision makers 
establish their own intelligence support. There, a team working under the U.S. 
Undersecretary of Defense, Douglas Feith, produced its own analysis, based on 
raw intelligence, supporting the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The result was seriously 
biased decisions.149 Intelligence services and their analysts, with years of 
experience, are experts in handling raw information and discerning whether it 
comes from reliable or questionable sources. Such discernment is essential as a 
basis for making decisions without the influence of political expediency. 
Norway has excellent research institutions, both military and civilian, 
working in the area of foreign policy. One similarity between these respected 
research institutions and the intelligence service is that both strive to fulfill high 
standards. Their main differences are their access to sources and their ability to 
implement the information gained. Both might have access to the same open 
information, depending on their relationships with key individuals. The 
intelligence services, however, have additional resources and the legal authority 
and techniques necessary for collecting information that a suspected enemy is 
trying to hide.   
1. Intelligence Process  
For the purposes of this thesis, the following definition of the term, 
intelligence process is used: 
 
 
                                                 
149 Mark Lowenthal. Intelligence, 183; and Georg Tennet, At the Center of the Storm (NY: 
Harper Collins, 2007), 348–349; Tennet was Director of the CIA, 1997–2004.  
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The term intelligence process refers to the steps or stages in 
intelligence, from policy makers perceiving a need for information to 
the community’s delivery of an analytical intelligence product to 
them.150 
In addition, Lowenthal emphasizes the difference between “information” and 
“intelligence.” Information is anything that can be obtained by anyone. 
Intelligence is information that is gathered, processed, analyzed, and narrowed to 
meet the needs of the decision-makers in the national interest (see Figure 16). 
“All intelligence is information, but all information is not intelligence.” 
 
Figure 16.   The Intelligence Process 
 
In Norway, the perceived total need for intelligence abroad is delineated in 
the instructions from the Ministry of Defense to the Intelligence Service. The 
content of that document is classified and not accessible by the public or the 
other ministries. Nevertheless, at present, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
assessed the relationship between it and the Intelligence Service as first-
                                                 
150 Lownethal,  54. 
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class.151 The Norwegian Police Security Service produces no similar document 
for domestic intelligence. Its missions for the forthcoming year are given in a 
letter of instruction in conjunction with the yearly budget.152 
D.  SUMMARY 
During the Cold War, the Norwegian Armed Forces was the key 
instrument used to execute Norway’s security policies. Since then, the Armed 
Forces’ role has become less dominant. Today, the execution of Norway’s 
security policy is divided among several ministries. The main threat against 
Norway is no longer nations with a well-organized armed force ready to attack. 
Today the main threat is the possibility of a terrorist attack that would have 
extensive consequences for the nation’s way of life and its values. 
To protect against this, the Norwegian government has implemented a 
broad security policy involving several ministries to combat the root causes of 
terrorism. At present, Norway is on the outskirts of the storm of terrorist activities, 
though that could change at any moment and our societal and human security be 
threatened.  
Because of this new threat environment, the thesis will argue that strategic 
support from Norway’s intelligence services is of increasing importance to the 
national decision-making process. Appropriate, trustworthy, unbiased, and 
reliable intelligence is essential for Norway’s decision-makers at all levels of the 
government. Criteria for a successful and an optimal intelligence service will be 
discussed further in the next chapter. 
                                                 
151 Interview with Special Adviser Jon Erik Stroemoe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 
4, 2007. 
152 Interview with Special Adviser Atle Tangen in Norwegian Police Security Service, 
September 7, 2007. 
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V.  STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT: CRITERIA FOR 
SUCCESS  
This chapter will present criteria for an ideal and successful intelligence 
support structure for the Norwegian Government and identify current shortfalls. 
The chapter will focus on the intelligence services’ role in supporting Norway’s 
foreign and security policies. It will describe three options for better organizing 
the intelligence services’ support for the Government decision makers and will 
analyze their comparative strengths and weaknesses. In doing so, the chapter 
provides a framework for the recommendations that will presented in Chapter VI. 
In Norway, traditionally, the work of the intelligence services has not been 
considered a part of the nation’s statecraft. It was noticeably absent from the 
conclusions reached by the 2000 Government Commission to evaluate Norway’s 
security vulnerabilities.153 Two years later, in an article entitled “The Norwegian  
Flexibility of Maneuver and the Need for an Overarching Strategy for Security 
Policy,” Ivar Neumann directly addressed the absence of a “grand strategy,” the 
lack of an overarching military doctrine, and the absence of strategic thinking 
outside purely military affairs.154 More recently, in Intelligence and the National 
Security Strategist, a textbook about the responsibilities and roles of intelligence 
services, Roger George and Robert Kline argue that “One of the key tasks of 
intelligence is to provide policymakers with forecasts and warnings.”155  Director 
Hagen of the NIS has also emphasized the increasing requirements of the NIS. 
 
                                                 
153 NOU 2000:24, 254. 
154 Iver N. Neuman, Norsk Handlingsrom og behovet for en overordnet sikkerhetspolitisk 
Startegi (The Norwegian  Flexibility of Maneuver, and the need for an overarching strategy for 
security policy) (Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek no 3), Oslo 2002, , available from 
http://www.atlanterhavskomiteen.no/Publikasjoner/Sikkerhetspolitisk_bibliotek/Arkiv/2002/pdf/3-
2002.pdf . (accessed October 3, 2007) 
155 Reed R. Probst, “Clausewitz’s on Intelligence,” in Roger Z. George and Robert D. Kleine, 
Eds., Intelligence and the National Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges (Rowman 
& Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Oxford, 2006), 4. 
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Historically, in Norway, intelligence has been considered part of the 
military establishment, and the forming and shaping of the nation’s 
defense and security policies were left to the military. But, in recent 
years, an increasing number of government officials have come to 
see the benefit of a reliable national intelligence service. As a 
result, the tasks of the intelligence community have considerably 
increased.156  
Nonetheless, an understanding and appreciation of the intelligence-
gathering and analytical processes and their potential remains limited within the 
political environment. Moreover, many might find it convenient to leave 
intelligence work to the military and the police, so as not to “disturb” the “real” 
workings of the Norwegian government and political institutions. 
Concerning this issue in the United States, Lowentahl names five key 
actors responsible for forming the U.S. national security policy: the President; 
various departments, but especially the State and Defense Departments; the 
National Security Council; the intelligence community; and the Congress.157 By 
comparison, in Norway, there are three key actors: the Government not the 
Prime Minister as an individual, but the collegium of ministers; the Storting; and 
the intelligence community. In addition, this thesis will argue that the media and 
the Norwegian citizenry are also influential actors, although the general public 
only exercises its formal power through elections every four years. Certainly, 
history shows that politicians are vulnerable to pressure from both those groups. 
This is especially the case when the government is composed of a coalition of 
parties, with or without majority support from the Storting. Moreover, for the last 
forty years, coalition governments have been the custom in Norway. The recent 
discussions concerning the participation and use of the Norwegian Armed Forces 
in support of the NATO-led International Stabilization Force in Afghanistan show 
clearly the challenges.  
 
                                                 
156 Torgeir Hagen, November 2006 
157 Lowentahl, 174-175. 
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A.  CRITERIA FOR A SUCCESSFUL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
COMMUNITY  
There are many official users of intelligence. In Norway, however, the 
Public Intelligence Act and the Intelligence Service focus primarily on the 
strategic level.158 Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the use of intelligence in 
direct support of military operations or police investigations and prosecution will 
not be discussed.  
The criteria used in this thesis derive from three main sources: a close 
study of the relevant literature (see the thesis bibliography); a course presented 
in 2007 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, entitled The 
Anatomy of Intelligence; and one-on-one discussions with the thesis advisers. 
This research identified six criteria, shown in Figure 17, that are critical for a 
national intelligence community’s strategic success. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Criteria for a successful national intelligence role 
 
                                                 
158 Odeltingsproposisjon #50 (1996-97), Remarks to the Public Act of Intelligence, MoD’s 




1. Supporting Political Goals and Assisting Diplomacy 
As thinking and imagination should be turned toward thinking about the 
future use of intelligence to shape a more peaceful world.”159 Norway has seen 
an increased demand for intelligence from a number of ministries because of the 
government’s ambitions in international politics and the possibility of conflicts of 
interest over resources in Norway’s geographical areas of interest. Indeed, the 
increased demand was highlighted in an NIS director’s speech in November 
2006.160 
Every year, the Ministry of Defense compiles a document for the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service that outlines the ministry’s responsibilities and the 
coordinated intelligence needs of the Government for the coming year.161 From 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ point of view, the NIS is not only a military 
intelligence agency, but also the nation’s only foreign intelligence service.162 
According to the MoFA, relations between the ministry and NIS are adequately 
assessed.163 However, the Intelligence Service is directed by the Chief of 
Defense and coordinated by the Ministry of Defense.164 The procedure is that the 
MoD is to be informed about enquiries made by the Foreign Affairs ministry to 
NIS. This authors research found that the MoFA is the only ministry that has such 
a direct access to the NIS.  
Due to purely economic interests and as an aspect of the nation’s foreign 
policy, Norwegian businesses are involved to some degree in a number of 
underdeveloped and unstable countries. In that involvement, it is uncertain how 
much the government contributes in the way of a security and threat assessment. 
                                                 
159 Deborah G. Barger, ”It IS Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence,” SAIS 
Review XXIV, no. 1 (Winter–Spring 2004). 
160 Torgeir  Hagen,  November 2006. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Jon Erik Stroemo, September, 2007. 
163 Ibid, 
164 Royal Instruction for NIS, §16. 
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Neither the Intelligence Service nor the Police Security Service has been tasked 
with supporting Norway’s economic interests. However, as specified in the NIS 
legislation, the NIS is required to contribute to “the shaping of Norwegian foreign, 
defense, and security policy.”  
One country that Norway is interested in and that poses no “direct” threat 
is Iran. As the newspaper Aftenposten revealed in September 2007, the NIS is 
involved in collecting intelligence both within and against Iran.165 Although he did 
not comment on the NIS contribution, the Secretary to the Minister of Defense 
made clear in that article that Iran and the whole Middle East are currently a 
focus area of the Norwegian government.  
Among government officials, there is increasing awareness of the ability of 
both the Intelligence Service and the Police Security Service to provide support 
for Norway’s decision-makers in preparing national policies and overseeing their 
execution at home and abroad. At the same time, the threats from failed 
governments and nonstate actors has increased the demands on the entire 
intelligence community for short- and long-term analyses in a number of 
Norway’s areas of interest.  
Historically, Norway has not supported the use of military pressure on 
foreign governments for regime change. Norway put a lot of effort, however, into 
supporting the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa before its regime 
shift, and in the peace processes in Sri Lanka and between Israel and the 
Palestinian authorities, to name only the most well known. Norway’s support of 
the ANC, in particular, was executed using elements of its embassy in Pretoria.  
For most of the government institutions and administrators involved in the 
development of Norway’s national security policy, the process for obtaining 
access to foreign intelligence might appear overly complicated and time-
consuming. At the same time, many politicians view intelligence much more as a 
                                                 
165 Aftenposten, Norge driver med spionasje i Iran (Norwegian espionage in Iran), 
September 7, 2007. 
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“cloak and dagger” activity than a supportive and useful tool in implementing  
and achieving the government’s political goals.  
This thesis will argue that the Norwegian model is time-consuming and 
that the intelligence community overall is giving too little access to ministries 
other than Foreign Affairs and Defense. Thus, the current structure is probably 
not the most efficient for assisting and supporting the nation’s achievement of its 
diplomatic and political goals.  
2. Protecting the Nation and its Human and Societal Security 
During the Cold War, Norway’s intelligence operations were largely 
successful. The Norwegian Intelligence Service maintained sufficient track of 
USSR activities in the High North and its capabilities and intentions. The 
government was informed regularly of any critical developments in the 
Norwegian/USSR border region that could threaten Norway’s peace and 
stability.until, finally, both the USSR and the Warsaw Pact collapsed. The threat-
warning responsibility stipulated in the NIS Public Act is also assessed to be be 
work well. Today, the task of protection has become more focused on threats 
from border-crossing nonstate actors, who may pose a danger to the nation’s 
human and societal security and its system of values.  
In Norway, the separation between domestic and foreign intelligence 
responsibilities is clearly expressed in respective legislation, but the increased 
threat from nonstate actors blurs the distinction between the strictly foreign and 
the domestic domain. At present, a joint police and military counterterrorist 
analysis cell is planned as a first step toward improving the nation’s ability to fight 
the new asymmetric threats.  
So far, no significant attack against its human and societal security has 
occurred in Norway. Unlike in other countries such as the UK and Germany, 
however, where the intelligence community’s ability to help protect the populace 
and maintain security is well known, the Norwegian public is completely unaware 
of the intelligence community’s contribution to this peaceful state.   
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This thesis argues that the Norwegian intelligence community would 
benefit and improve both in its effectiveness and in its acceptance by the 
Norwegian public if it worked with more openness about its contributions to the 
safety and security of the general society. 
3. A Short, Clear Chain of Command between Decision Makers 
and the Intelligence Community 
To ensure maintenance of the right priorities, direction, relevant support, 
and an effective feedback loop, it is essential that the intelligence community 
maintain a close relationship with the national decision makers. It is long past the 
time when the only input required from the IC by the government is a threat 
warning of Extreme, High, Medium, or Low, as was the case at the height of the 
Cold war.  
The United Kingdom has made good use of its analytical center, the Joint 
Intelligence Committee, which directly supports and is part of the Office of the 
Prime Minister.166 Similarly, in 2006, the Swedish government established a 
Department for Preparedness and Analyses, which directly supports its Prime 
Minister. The department is responsible for overseeing major global incidents 
and for assisting the Prime Minister and other ministers in the decision-making 
process.167 The department is still small, however, and under continuing 
development.   
In Norway, there are no intelligence bodies or positions within the Office of 
the Prime Minister (OPM) and thus no one to provide either the Prime Minister or 
members of his government with intelligence input and support directly.168 In 
addition, both the OPM Departments of Foreign Affairs and Domestic Affairs 
                                                 
166 National Intelligence Machinery: The official United Kingdom description of the British 
Intelligence Community, accessed March 5, 2007, at: 
http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/central_intelligence_machinery.aspx  
167 Swedish Government, Office of the Prime Minister, official webpage, Department for 
Preparedness and Analyzes, available from http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2247/a/54230 
(accessed October 1, 2007). 
168 E-mail from the the Office of the Prime Minister, Senior Adviser Oivind Ostang, Oct 2, 
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consist of only five civil servants each. In the Norwegian system, therefore, there 
is no collection of intelligence or other intelligence resource at all allocated in 
direct support of the Prime Minister’s office, even not from the analytical side. 
Thus, this thesis will argue that, in the Norwegian model, the connection between 
executive power and the intelligence services is not close and tight enough to 
meet the security demands of the future.  
4. Relevant, Timely, Reliable, and Informative 
As a rule, one of the intelligence services’ main goals is assessing and 
anticipating the future in accordance with a country’s political priorities. 
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that the intelligence community be able 
to present relevant forecasts and projections about future political concerns and 
threats in a timely manner. Such ability includes also the flexibility to change 
focus and direction when needed. Intelligence presentations may be in the form 
of threat assessments, whether from without or within the country, or in the form 
of input into and support of decisions concerning the nation’s “interests in relation 
to foreign countries, organizations or individuals,” as is stipulated in the NIS 
legislation. Overall, therefore, the increasing demand in Norway for NIS and 
NPSS products should be seen as a clear signal that those products are relevant 
and reliable.  
Normally, Norway’s intelligence findings are handled by the respective 
ministries in Defense or Justice and then forwarded to the Office of the Prime 
Minister as part of their regular contributions. Occasionally, however, intelligence 
reports may be forwarded directly to the OPM or to the Government, although the 
Prime Minister’s Office has no direct capacity for handling intelligence.169   
In these regards, this thesis will conclude, in general, that Norway’s 
intelligence products are relevant and reliable, but their use is not as effective as 
it might be due to the physical separation between the intelligence community 
                                                 
169 E-mail from the the Office of the Prime Minister, Senior Adviser Oivind Ostang, Oct 2, 
2007.. 
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and the Office of the Prime Minister and the Government. This distancing can 
hinder a timely communication between the decision makers and their could-be-
better supporters in the intelligence services.  
5. Legislative, Executive, and Public Support 
The Norwegian intelligence community’s ability to be considered a 
necessary asset for political and government decision-makers depends on the 
intelligence agencies’ credibility with the Norwegian populace. The Lund 
Commission in 1996 and additional legislation since and to date have increased 
and enhanced that credibility. However, when some foreign intelligence services 
were accused of serious failures connected with the 9/11 tragedy and the Iraq 
campaign, critical voices were raised in Norway concerning its intelligence 
community as well. Their criticism was and is based, not on any specific 
identified failures, but on the people’s diminished trust, one result of the 
Government’s failure to release information about the intelligence services’ 
contribution to the decision-making process.  
In September 2007, an article in Aftenposten, entitled “An Increasing 
Crises of Confidence,”170  raised this very issue, the lack of openness. Within the 
media, few voices speak against the need for national intelligence support, 
although some do speak about the processes of intelligence collection. There is 
some criticism of the expanded information-collecting methods that the police are 
now allowed to use. And an increasing number of voices are being raised to 
protest the way that all information concerning the intelligence community is 
classified as “non-releasable” in the public domain.  
This thesis will argue that the Storting and the government have handled 
the regulation of the Norwegian intelligence services effectively and well. The  
 
 
                                                 
170 Harald Stanghelle, Mot en tillitskrise? (An increasing Crises of Confidence?). 
Aftenposten, September 3, 2007. Stanghelle is the Political Editor of Aftenposten, 
  84
Storting has passed appropriate and relevant legislation to assure proper 
legislative oversight, Acts that have then been updated by Royal Instructions to 
assure their relevance. 
The thesis finds that both the Government and the intelligence agencies 
themselves over-classify intelligence results and conceal information about the 
agencies and the way they contribute to and support the established political 
goals. In the long term, such policies will only hinder the intelligence institutions’ 
ability to support their principals. 
6. Unity of Effort 
In Norway in 2007, the two main (of three) intelligence agencies, the 
Police Security Service and the Intelligence Service, were funded approximately 
one billion NKR (US$150 million) by the Storting. Compared to the United States, 
where the turnover is around US$40 billion and there are sixteen agencies to 
coordinate, the Norway’s three secret services should be reasonably easy to 
control.  
Critics often ask: Are the intelligence services able to use their recourses 
– money, people, and technical assets – in an efficient manner in support of 
national peace, security and foreign policy? In Norway both the Government 
Committee for Coordination and Advice (CCA) and the High Level Council are 
tasked to ensure proper coordination, but there is little unclassified information 
available concerning their activities in recent years. 
Interviews with key Norwegian officials in September 2007 indicated that 
the interagency relations were satisfactory.171 The interviewees pointed out that 
the analysts involved are provided with opportunities to discuss assessments 
across agencies before any conclusions are reached.172 As a result, a number of 
minor joint products were evidenced.   
                                                 
171 Research in Norway, 2007. 
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The Norwegian Police Security Service and the Intelligence Service’s 
main direction, or focus area, is stipulated in related legislation, as is their 
respective focus on domestic and foreign affairs. Concerning NIS priorities, the 
Ministry of Defense produces a yearly document that gives NIS its directions. 
The planned establishment of a Norwegian “Joint Terrorist Analysis Center” is 
estimated to further increase and enhance communication between the two main 
intelligence services. 
It is estimated that the NIS Division of Technical Collection and 
Assessment controls more technical assets than the NPSS. However, the 
Division’s focus is intelligence gathering directed at foreign targets. Since the 
Lund Commission Report of 1996, no serious accusations have been made 
concerning the NIS’s directing of assets at domestic targets, however practical 
such operations might seem. In this repect, its difference from the U.S. National 
Security Agency is significant. If the NIS in its intelligence collection abroad 
comes across information related to domestic targets, in keeping with 
government regulations – legislation §9 in the Public Act and §4 in the Royal 
Instructions, and agreements between the ministries – this information must be 
handed over to the police.173 
In sum, this thesis will argue that in recent years the two intelligence 
services have been able to effectively unite their efforts when required in times of 
national necessity.  
B.  WAYS TO FURTHER IMPROVE AND ENHANCE THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES  
This section will describe possible ways that the intelligence services and 
their support might be improved and their effectiveness enhanced, as shown in 
Figure 18. 
                                                 
173 K. Storberget, and A-G.Stroem-Erichsen, March 9, 2007. 
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Figure 18.   Overview of ways of improvement 
 
1. Joint Recommendation #1, the Establishment of a Joint 
Intelligence Cell at the Office of the Prime Minister 
The first joint recommendation is that a small Joint Intelligence Cell (JIC) 
be established that would consist of a number of senior civil servants and officers 
from both the NPSS and the NIS and be subordinated to the Office of the Prime 
Minister. Its main focus would be to ensure that the Government has direct 
access to the intelligence community, their reports and estimates, in order to 
reinforce and improve the decisions and the decision-making process. Further, 
the JIC should contribute to the understanding of how the intelligence services 
could be a valuable integral part of the decision-making process, not merely a 
producer of intelligence-reports on demand. If approved, the JIC should be a 
participant in the formation of a joint requirement and priority document 
(REQPRIDOC) to ensure that the intelligence community maintains an 
appropriate focus and quality control. (Legislative control of the intelligence 
services is the responsibility of the Storting and its EOS committee.) A Joint 
Intelligence Cell at the Office of the Prime Minister could also act as a permanent 
secretariat for the Committee for Coordination and Advice, to further ensure 
coordination of the intelligence efforts with the Government.  
  87
Legislative challenges. This recommendation does not in and of itself 
necessitate a legislative change. However, an updated Public Act covering the 
responsibilities of the new Joint Intelligence Cell and its relation to the NIS and 
NPSS would increase both the legislature’s and the public’s general support and 
acceptance of the intelligence community’s key role in forming and implementing 
Norway’s foreign and security policies. The Public Act, in §3, is intended to cover 
the intelligence community’s contribution to the decision-making process, a role 
that includes, but is not limited to, security threats.174 
Advantages. If implemented, the creation of a Joint Intelligence Cell 
would ensure a closer, better-supported decisions, more mutual and effective 
relationship between the executive branch and the intelligence services on a 
daily basis, while at the same time maintaining the Prime Minister’s need for 
distance and independence from the intelligence community. The possibility for 
fragmented information mentioned by Report #9 (see Chapter I) would be more 
limited. Government decisions would therefore be better informed and its ability 
to direct the overall intelligence effort would be increased. This thesis will argue 
that a JIC staffed with the right civil servants and intelligence officers would soon 
demonstrate its value for all the parties concerned: the executive power, the 
legislative power, and their intelligence supporters.  
Disadvantages. It is reasonable to anticipate that, initially, the 
establishment of a Joint Intelligence Cell would trigger resistance – a “turf war,” 
so to speak – both in the involved ministries and in the intelligence services 
themselves. The need to assign the appropriate competences from the services, 
for example, might cause concern, but this would be greatly eased by the 
creation of new, or “fresh,” posts for the new tasks. 
Feasibility. This author will argue that the establishment of a Joint 
Intelligence Cell as described here is an entirely feasible way to improve and 
enhance the effectiveness of the intelligence services.  
                                                 
174 Public Act for NIS and the Royal Instructions for NIS. 
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2. Joint Recommendation #2, the Establishment of a Joint 
Requirement and Priority Document 
The second joint recommendation is that a Joint Requirement and Priority 
Document (REQPRIDOC) be published yearly in a version that shows the 
requirements and priorities of the whole intelligence community. Both a classified 
and an unclassified version of the Document should be produced by the Joint 
Intelligence Cell and approved by the Prime Minister and his Government as a 
document of instruction for the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Justice 
and Police. Obviously, this report should not reveal information concerning the 
methods and assets used by the intelligence services. Further, the RECPRIDOC 
should also be used as an evaluation tool of the effectiveness and quality of the 
intelligence community. 
However, the publication of an unclassified version need not depend on 
the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Cell. In its application to the NIS it can 
be handled as it is today by the Ministry of Defense; in its application to the 
NPSS, it could (and should) be incorporated by the Ministry of Justice and Police.  
Legislative challenges. The publication of an unclassified version of the 
Requirement and Priority Document does not in and of itself require a legislative 
change. However, updating the Public Acts legislation concerning the 
responsibilities of the Ministries of Defense and Justice to include the production 
of an unclassified version would both increase their national value and facilitate 
the report’s implementation. 
Advantages. An unclassified documentation of the Norwegian intelligence 
community’s requirements and priorities would evidence their impact on the 
national decision-making apparatus and the concrete results of the one billion 
NKR designated for these services. Furthermore, this thesis would argue that the 
existence of such a document, accessible by the people, would greatly reduce 
the number of unsupported charges of ineptitude by the media and members of 
the Storting. An intelligence community that had greater support from the 
Norwegian people and was freed from the onerous task of defending itself from 
  89
unwarranted accusations could then dedicate more time and effort to the peace 
and security needs of the country and the world at large. 
Disadvantages. Publication of an unclassified version of the Document 
would probably meet significant resistance from both the responsible ministries 
and the intelligence services themselves. This resistance could initially result in a  
product bothered by some teething problems. 
Feasibility. This author will argue that the publication of an unclassified 
version of an Requirement and Priority Document is an entirely feasible way to 
improve and enhance the role and value of the intelligence services.  
3. Option 1. Maintaining the Current Structure of the Intelligence 
Community  
This option would have no impact on the overall structure within the 
Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Justice and Police as shown in Figure 19. The 
Police and Security Service would continue as a domestic intelligence service 
subordinated to the MoJ. The Intelligence Service would continue as a military 
[foreign] intelligence service subordinated to the Chief of Defense. 
However, if a joint intelligence support element were established, as 
described in Joint Recommendation #1, within the Office of the Prime Minister, 
the NPSS/NIS should staff the Joint Intelligence Cell with senior civil servants 
and intelligence officers. This structuring would ensure a much closer connection 
between the Government and its intelligence support services. If an unclassified 
Requirement and Priority Document were published, as this thesis also 




Figure 19.   Current structure of the NIS within the MOD  (as seen today) 
 
Legislative challenges. Only those discussed above regarding the first 
and second joint recommendations.  
Advantages. If the current structure of the intelligence community is 
maintained, the intelligence services and their respective ministries would 
experience little disturbance because no significant changes would be 
implemented.    
Disadvantages. Since the NIS would continue as a Chief of Defense 
asset, the ability for the Prime Minister and the government to more effectively 
use NIS resources would not be enhanced.  
Feasibility. Maintaining the current structure of the intelligence community 
is a feasible option. 
4. Option 2. Restructuring by Subordinating the NIS Directly 
under the Minister of Defense 
In keeping with an expanded role for Norway’s other government 
ministries in their implementation of the foreign and security policies, the 
Norwegian Intelligence Service would no longer be subordinated to the Chief of 
Defense, but would be relocated, directly subordinated and answerable to the 
Minister of Defense, as shown in Figure 20.  
  91
 
Figure 20.   Restructuring and relocation of the NIS within the MoD  
 
Such restructuring would bring the NIS closer to its main strategic users 
without necessitating significant changes in its internal structure. However, this 
option would require that the Chief of Defense keep a small subordinate 
intelligence element to maintain relations between the NIS and the military 
intelligence consumers both domestic and foreign. This reorganization will have 
no impact on the NPSS as an agency directly subordinate to the Ministry of 
Justice and Police. 
This option does not depend on the implementation of the joint 
recommendations. But the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Cell and the 
publication of a Joint Requirement and Priority Document, as described above, 
would add support for this option. 
Legislative challenges. Implementing this option would require updating 
the Public Acts legislation and the Royal Instructions pertaining to the NIS and 
Instructions for the Chief of Defense. Changes to the Public Acts are made by 
the Storting; the Government can execute an update of the Royal Instructions.  
Advantages. The main advantage of this option is that it would result in a 
better-supported national decision-making process. Although the Minister of 
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Foreign Affairs can approach the NIS directly today, this option would formalize 
current Foreign Affairs practices. Over time, this could also increase the value of 
national intelligence support within the Government and among the public. With 
increased public support for its services, the intelligence community would be 
better able to execute its tasks at an even higher standard than today. In 
addition, the intelligence elements in the Armed Forces could use such a 
reorganization to establish a joint military intelligence effort in direct support of 
the warfighter. 
Disadvantages. This option would require changes in the current 
overhead structure of the Ministry of Defense and the responsibilities of the Chief 
of Defense. This author estimate that implementing this option would encounter 
serious resistance from within the military, which would no doubt view the 
restructuring as an unnecessary reduction of the Chief of Defense’s position 
within Norway’s overall foreign- and security-policy structure. In addition, it would 
necessitate the establishment of a small intelligence coordinating element within 
the Defense staff. However, the option would not require a comprehensive 
reorganization of either the Norwegian Intelligence Service or the Armed Forces. 
Feasibility. Restructuring and subordinating the NIS directly under the 
Minister of Defense is a feasible option that would improve and enhance the role 
of Norway’s intelligence services. 
5. Option 3. Establishment of a Civil Foreign Intelligence Service  
The thesis research shows that one possible change might be to divide 
and reorganize the Norwegian Intelligence Service into a civilian foreign 
intelligence service and a military intelligence service, making the civil 
intelligence part subordinate to the Office of the Prime Minister or the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. At present, however, because the Prime Minister is not the head 
of a government ministry, according to the Constitution, no agency can be 
subordinated to his office. What is more, the Foreign Affairs ministry is neither 
structured nor organized today in a way that would facilitate its taking 
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responsibility for a foreign intelligence service as a subordinate. Finally, no 
matter how useful a civil intelligence service might be, the present system is 
working competently. Thus, the necessity for further restructuring and the cost of 
such a dramatic change would most likely outweigh the benefits of this solution. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has discussed the relations between the Norwegian Executive 
Power, the Government, the Legislative Power, the Storting, and their two main 
intelligence supporters, the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS), and the 
Norwegian Police Security Service (NPSS). 
Although both the NIS and the NPSS have tasks related to the support of 
military operations and (police) investigation and prosecution, their main focus as 
strategic intelligence services is to support the Government in forming and 
shaping the Norway’s foreign and security policies and protecting the nation’s  
human and societal security. 
While the overall structure of the intelligence community was sufficient 
during the Cold War, this thesis argues that that structure is not sufficient today. 
To handle tomorrow’s more complex world, given the increasing importance of 
the High North, border-crossing nonstate actors, and a security policy that 
includes a number of ministries in addition to the Minister of Defense, this thesis 
has recommended a number of changes.  
The thesis concludes that the current political oversight of the Norwegian 
Storting is acceptable and has political and public support. The thesis argues that 
the overarching relations between the Government and its supporters are 
working. However, it also argues that there are flaws in the overall structure and 
that an absence of public information concerning the nature and contributions of 
the services creates an unnecessary disturbance.  
An implementation of Joint Recommendation #1, the establishment of a 
Joint Intelligence Cell at the Office of the Prime Minister, would significantly 
increase the intelligence communities’ ability to support Norway’s political goals. 
An implementation of Joint Recommendation #2, the production of a Joint 
Requirement and Priority Document in both unclassified and classified versions 
that visualize results of the past and expectations for the future. This author 
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argues that producing such a document would significantly increase the the 
services focus and the public’s support and thus reinforce the intelligence 
community’s ability to support its principles. Such a document will also increase 
the joint effort of the services and enhance inter-service relations.  
Chapter V discussed the success criteria for intelligence support and 
possible options for reorganizing strategic intelligence support. Table 1 illustrates 


























0 0 0 0 0 0 
Option 1 + 
JIC at OPM + 0 0 + ++ + 
Option 1 + 
JIC and 
REQPRIDOC 
++ + 0 ++ ++ ++ 




direct to MoD 
+ 0 ++ + ++ + 
Option 2 + 
JIC at OPM +++ 0 ++ ++ +++ ++ 
Option 2 + 
JIC and 
REQPRIDOC 
++++ + +++ ++ ++++ +++
Option 3 
A civil foreign 
intelligence 
service 
Not feasible, see Chapter V/B/5 
Table 1.   A visual comparison of the three possible models 
 
  97
In sum, this thesis recommends that the Norwegian Intelligence Service 
be moved from its current subordination under the Chief of Defense and 
subordinated directly to the Minster of Defense. Such a restructuring will 
establish a small new intelligence liaison-and-support element within the Defense 
Staff to oversee the relations between the NIS and the Armed Forces. Further, 
the Office of the Prime Minister should be assigned a supportive Joint 
Intelligence Cell, who also would be responsible to develop a Joint Requirement 
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